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INTRODUCTION
Early on November 4, 2020, former President Donald Trump falsely
claimed that he had won the 2020 presidential election.1 Of course, he
had lost, and the election ended up not being particularly close by his own
standards.2 Despite a prolonged vote counting process which fueled
conspiratorial cries of a stolen election amongst many Republicans,3 the

1 Reality Check Team, US Election 2020: Fact-Checking Trump’s Speech on Election Night,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-54811406
[https://perma.cc/WK5E-Y69Q].
2 See Katelyn Newman, Trump Tweets Thanks to ‘Deplorables,’ U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-11-08/trump-tweets-thanksto-deplorables-on-election-day-anniversary
[https://perma.cc/58MB-WG540];
Elections
Overview,
PBS
NEWSHOUR,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/elections-2020/results
[https://perma.cc/DUT8-3PMA].
3 Fredreka Schouten & Jeremy Herb, Here's Why the Vote Count Is Still Going in Key States,
CNN (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/05/politics/vote-count-key-states/index.html
[https://perma.cc/LD6J-MK8M] (“Counts were delayed by a record flood of mail-in ballots.”); Jan
Zilinsky, Jonathan Nagler & Joshua Tucker, Which Republicans Are Most Likely to Think the
Election Was Stolen? Those Who Dislike Democrats and Don’t Mind White Nationalists., WASH.
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United States’ decentralized election system conducted a free, fair, and
highly secure election.4 Yet, even under these democratically favorable
conditions, the presidential election could have been much closer and its
outcome actually uncertain, as in 2000.5 Specifically, the presidential
election could have plausibly come down to hundreds of votes in two
states where litigation to determine absentee ballot postmark and receipt
deadlines remained in flux.6
Prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,7 federal elections
in the United States were already unnecessarily complicated.8 In the runup to the general election in November, dozens of states confronted the
challenge of how to effectively run primaries while providing necessary
additional safety protocols during a pandemic.9 After election officials
struggled to ensure a smooth voting process in states such as Georgia and
Wisconsin in the pandemic’s earlier days,10 many jurisdictions rushed to
POST (Jan. 19, 2021, 5:07 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/19/whichrepublicans-think-election-was-stolen-those-who-hate-democrats-dont-mind-white-nationalists
[https://perma.cc/52DN-V5N5].
4 Press Release, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, Joint Statement from
Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the Election Infrastructure Sector
Coordinating Executive Committees (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/
joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election
[https://perma.cc/X3X7-4JUJ].
5 Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election
of 2000, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 335, 339 (2001) (noting that the election in 2000 ended in a
statistical tie).
6 For the purposes of this Note, “voting by mail” and “absentee balloting” will be used
interchangeably. While semantically there may be slight differences surrounding whether a voter
requested their ballot and whether an excuse is necessary, the two terms describe the same general
process: voting using a ballot sent to a registered voter’s mailing address rather than a vote being
cast in person at a polling place or local official’s office. See Dylan Matthews, Trump Insists
Absentee Ballots Are Fair but Mail Voting Is Corrupt. That’s Nonsense., VOX MEDIA (Sept. 14,
2020, 11:06 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/8/18/21373478/absentee-ballotvote-by-mail-voting [https://perma.cc/H57N-3ZT8].
7 For purposes of referring to COVID-19, the pandemic began in the United States in early
2020 and has continued through the time of this Note’s publication. See Kathy Katella, Our
Pandemic
Year—A
COVID-19
Timeline,
YALE
MED.
(Mar.
9,
2021),
https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/covid-timeline [https://perma.cc/3MAG-CJZR].
8 Tiana Epps-Johnson, Why Is Voting in the US So Difficult?, TED CONFS. (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://ideas.ted.com/why-is-voting-in-the-us-so-difficult [https://perma.cc/RE8P-YJX7] (noting
that even the most determined voters encounter barriers, like outdated technology systems, when
voting).
9 Nathaniel Rakich, We’ve Had 56 Statewide Elections During the Pandemic. Here’s What
We Learned from Them., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/weve-had-56-statewide-elections-during-the-pandemic-heres-what-we-learned-fromthem [https://perma.cc/5V8U-4FPX] (noting a spike in mail-in voting after the pandemic began
and a correlational increase in voter turnout).
10 Danny Hakim, Reid J. Epstein & Stephanie Saul, Anatomy of an Election ‘Meltdown’ in
Georgia, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2020, 6:40 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/us/politics/
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expand access to voting by mail as a safe alternative to potentially
crowded polling places.11
This expansion consequently led to litigation in the vast majority of
states.12 Although legal fights over absentee ballot deadlines are nothing
new,13 COVID-19 gave rise to an explosion of colorable equal protection
claims on the subject.14 As a result, these cases laid bare what has long
been true: by virtue of where one lives as an American voter, one citizen
may have more—or an easier—time voting than one’s neighbor in
another state.15
Though states are entitled to set the rules of their own elections,
Congress reigns supreme in the determination of federal election rules,
deriving this authority from the Constitution’s Elections Clause.16
Nevertheless, recent experience suggests that eleventh-hour federal court
rulings prior to Election Day have done more to shape state absentee
ballot deadline rules for federal elections than congressional

georgia-election-voting-problems.html [https://perma.cc/TRE7-RCPN]; Chad Cotti, Bryan
Engelhardt, Joshua Foster, Erik Nesson & Paul Niekamp, The Relationship Between In-Person
Voting and COVID-19: Evidence from the Wisconsin Primary, 39 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 760–
61, 774 (2021) (“[O]verall results suggest that a 10% increase in voters per polling location leads
to about an 18% increase in the test-positive rate.”).
11 See Rakich, supra note 9 (noting that expansion of pandemic mail voting coincided with poll
closures in some states).
12 For comprehensive tracking of this litigation, see Voting Rights Litigation 2020, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/votingrights-litigation-2020 [https://perma.cc/3SWT-G3ET].
13 See, e.g., Laura McCrystal, Montco Judge Extends Deadline for Absentee Ballots, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/20161104_Montco_
seeks_to_extend_deadline_for_absentee_ballots.html [https://perma.cc/UAX5-HG5D].
14 See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann (DNC), 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 958 (W.D.
Wis. 2020) (recognizing an equal protection claim due to COVID and stating that the “role of a
federal district court is to take steps that help avoid the impingement on citizens’ rights to exercise
their voting franchise as protected by the United States Constitution”); Disability L. Ctr. of Alaska
v. Meyer, 484 F. Supp. 3d 693, 707 (D. Alaska 2020) (“Plaintiffs have failed to convince this Court
that its [sic] equal protection claims are likely to succeed on the merits.”); First Amended Complaint
at 30–31, League of Women Voters of N.J. v. Way, No. 20-CV-05990-MAS-LHG (D.N.J. June 3,
2020), 2020 WL 6535230, ¶¶ 98–103; Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at 24, Yazzie
v. Hobbs, No. 20-CV-08222-GMS (D. Ariz. Aug. 26, 2020), 2020 WL 5049638, ¶¶ 13, 112–16.
15 See How Hard Is It to Vote in Your State?, NIU NEWSROOM (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://newsroom.niu.edu/2020/10/13/how-hard-is-it-to-vote-in-your-state
[https://perma.cc/
6V4B-R4DZ] (scaling and mapping the varying degrees of difficulty that voters encounter in their
effort to cast votes in each state).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.”).
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lawmaking.17 This Note argues that this reality is inherently problematic
because not only do these court rulings often breed uncertainty for
voters,18 but they also create functional circuit splits very shortly before
federal elections.19 In other words, regardless of the legal reasoning that
federal courts apply, many 2020 election voters in certain states enjoyed
the fruits of ballot deadline extensions, while others did not.20 To prevent
such nonsensical outcomes, Congress should draft legislation using its
underutilized Elections Clause power to standardize absentee ballot
request, postmark, and deadline dates for federal elections.21 Doing so
would not only provide greater certainty to the electoral process than
federal courts can provide, but also avoid a disputed election in a heated
sociopolitical environment that could make the January 6, 2020, U.S.
Capitol insurrection seem tame in hindsight.22
To support this argument, Sections I.A and I.B of this Note will
provide a historical overview of voting by mail in the United States, while
surveying the current state of vote-by-mail law and the motivations
underlying modern absentee ballot deadline litigation, respectively.
Then, Section I.C will discuss the relevant legal arguments and principles
prevalent in such cases and will include a detailed recounting of how
federal courts decided pre-election ballot deadline cases in North
Carolina, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Next, Part II
17 The U.S. House of Representatives passed a comprehensive piece of legislation related to
absentee balloting in March of 2019, but the Senate did not vote on the bill. See For the People Act
of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. Subtitle I (2019). The U.S. House recently passed a very similar bill
in the most recent Congress, but its future is uncertain. See For the People Act, H.R. 1, 117th Cong.
Subtitle I (2021). See also infra Part III for its discussion of H.R. 1 in greater detail.
18 Olivia Rubin, Kendall Karson & Lucien Bruggeman, ‘Don’t Wait’: Some Swing State
Officials Urge Voters to Bypass the Mail to Return Ballots, ABC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2020, 5:01 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/dont-wait-swing-state-officials-urge-voters-bypass/story?
id=73867343 [https://perma.cc/RQ7K-RBZ3] (noting state party officials warning voters about the
uncertainty of ballot deadlines as litigation continued leading up to Election Day 2020).
19 For purposes of this Note, a “functional circuit split” refers to the idea that even though the
application of relevant law in two circuits may be the same or very similar, quirks of election
jurisprudence, such as the Purcell principle, see infra Section I.C.i.2, cause voters to experience a
different practical outcome, i.e., benefiting from a ballot extension in one state but not another. See,
e.g., text accompanying notes 156 and 157. The introduction of this term seeks to draw attention to
an outcome-based approach, regardless of whether two courts applied the law dissimilarly as in a
regular circuit split situation.
20 See infra Section I.C.ii (contrasting the Minnesota and North Carolina absentee ballot case
decisions).
21 See infra Part III (introducing the proposal and discussing details of the strengths and
deficiencies of H.R. 1).
22 See infra Section II.A (analyzing the negative effect of circuit splits). Removing courts from
electoral decisions could also depoliticize the federal courts to a certain extent. The call for
depoliticization around the Supreme Court is not a new idea in the legal academic literature. See,
e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 769, 834–36 (2006) (arguing that term limits would
depoliticize the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation processes).
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analyzes why the uncertainty and circuit splits that Article III courts’
rulings produce offend basic principles of American law, as well as how
these outcomes have deviated from the Founders’ original intent
regarding the Elections Clause. After illustrating how Congress has
recently underutilized its Elections Clause power, Part III then suggests
certain particulars for federal standardization and argues in favor of a
jurisdictional-stripping element in such a legislative proposal while
addressing opposing arguments.
Finally, much of the 2020 absentee ballot litigation related to other
technical aspects of voting such as drop boxes, signature verification, and
ballot processing timelines.23 However, this Note focuses primarily on
vote-by-mail ballot request, postmark, and arrival deadlines. Thus, any
ancillary discussion of other technical aspects of the general vote-by-mail
process will be used to contextualize the absentee ballot deadline
litigation that this Note critiques.24
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Brief Historical Overview of Voting by Mail in the United States
i.

The Military Context

Absentee voting in the United States began during one of our
nation’s darkest historical moments: the election of 1864 during the Civil
War.25 Notably, several Union and Confederate states, rather than the
federal government, passed laws which enabled soldiers to vote absentee
in that presidential election.26 Like American civilians today, this
patchwork of laws meant soldiers fighting for the same cause did not

23 See, e.g., Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261 (D.S.C.), stayed in part, 141 S. Ct. 9,
10 (2020) (explaining plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction against South Carolina’s witness
signature requirement due to the COVID-19 pandemic); Complaint & Emergency Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Moran v. Massachusetts, No. 20-CV-12171-ADB (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2020)
(alleging inconsistencies in signature verification); American Fed’n of Teachers v. Gardner, No.
216-2020-CV-0570 (N.H. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2020) (denying plaintiff’s request for drop box
restrictions to be lifted).
24 See, e.g., Sections I.A.iii, I.B.i (discussing the patchwork of absentee ballot legal changes
due to COVID and the web of disparate state laws governing the process before the pandemic,
respectively).
25 JOHN C. FORTIER, ABSENTEE AND EARLY VOTING: TRENDS, PROMISES, AND PERILS 7
(2006).
26 Id. at 8.
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necessarily obtain equal ballot access.27 For example, soldiers hailing
from New York and Alabama could vote absentee from the battlefield,
while compatriots in combat from the neighboring states of New Jersey
and Mississippi, respectively, could not.28 This lack of standardization for
military members persisted for years, until Congress formally
acknowledged soldiers’ logistical challenge of voting far from home by
passing a series of laws in the twentieth century culminating in the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986
(UOCAVA).29
Well prior to this late twentieth century federal standardization in
the military context, litigation quickly ensued regarding the validity of
state absentee ballot laws in the mid-nineteenth century.30 For example,
some state courts struck down the earliest absentee ballot laws as
violating their respective state constitutions, while other state courts of
last resort upheld the practice as falling within the state legislature’s
ability to set the time and place of elections.31 However, litigation
concerning the practice has exploded since the late twentieth century as
plaintiffs have sought to use the courts to accord themselves a potentially
decisive political advantage.32

27 Id. At the time, Union Democrats who supported General McClellan’s candidacy were more
likely to oppose these laws, while President Lincoln’s Republican Party viewed soldiers voting
absentee as advantageous to him. See Meilan Solly, The Debate Over Mail-In Voting Dates Back
to the Civil War, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/debate-over-mail-voting-dates-back-civil-war-180976091 [https://perma.cc/WLW5-BURA]
(describing, as a general rule, that Civil War-era state legislatures controlled by Democrats opposed
absentee voting, whereas President Lincoln’s Republican Party supported the practice).
28 John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot: Challenges
for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 493 nn.48–49 (2003); see also JOSIAH HENRY
BENTON, VOTING IN THE FIELD: A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL WAR 312–13 (1915).
29 FORTIER, supra note 25, at 10–13; 52 U.S.C. § 20303; 39 U.S.C. § 3406 (providing free
postage and a backup federal absentee ballot to service members and citizens living abroad who
did not receive their respective states’ ballots on time); 18 U.S.C. §§ 608–609 (criminally
proscribing anyone from impeding a U.S. servicemember’s right to vote as it relates to the rest of
UOCAVA’s provisions).
30 Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 28, at 499.
31 Id.; see People ex rel. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127 (1865).
32 Richard L. Hasen, The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From Bad to Worse, 26 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 629, 630 (2018) (“In the period since 2000, the amount of election-related litigation has
more than doubled compared to the period before 2000, from an average of 94 cases per year in the
period just before 2000 to an average of 258 cases per year in the post-2000 period.”); see also
Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to
Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 958 (2005) (showing a graphical increase
in election litigation).
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Early Civilian and Modern Usage

The adoption of the secret ballot paved the way for states to expand
absentee balloting for civilians, and such laws proliferated with the
acknowledgement that many working people were not always close
enough to home on Election Day to be able to vote.33 While new voting
expansions in states like Vermont and North Dakota seem restrictive by
today’s standards, they were groundbreaking in the early twentieth
century.34 States thus quickly expanded absentee voting, yet before
World War II, the patchwork of discrepancies between each state’s laws
that are commonplace today had already emerged.35 By the end of the
twentieth century—among other limitations—some states required
witness signatures to vote absentee depending on a voter’s
circumstance(s), while others did not; concurrently, each state continues
to set its own request, postmark, and arrival deadlines.36
In 2000, Oregon became the first state to exclusively vote by mail
following a successful 1998 citizens’ initiative advancing the practice.37
Over the course of the next twenty years, a handful of Western states
followed suit.38 While cries of fraud have accompanied some of these
expansions,39 these states have demonstrated that—even prior to COVID19—all-mail elections can be conducted freely, fairly, and without any
meaningful fraud.40 Perhaps just as importantly for the purposes of this

JOSEPH P. HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 283 (1934).
Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 30, at 499, 502.
35 Id. at 504 (noting that between 1914 and 1917, the number of states with some form of
civilian absentee voting skyrocketed from three to twenty-four); see also HARRIS, supra note 33,
at 291 (showing that as of 1934, California, as it does today, provided for a greater window between
postmark and arrival date than any other state).
36 Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 28, at 511. For the final rules that governed the 2020 election
from state to state, see Absentee and Mail Voting Policies in Effect for the 2020 Election, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/absentee-and-mail-voting-policies-in-effect-for-the-2020-election.aspx
[https://perma.cc/C5HE-635R].
37 OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON VOTE BY MAIL 4–11 (2000),
https://sos.oregon.gov/elections/Documents/statistics/vote-by-mail-timeline.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6W68-43M6] (detailing Oregon’s evolution to a full vote-by-mail state starting in 2000).
38 All-Mail Voting, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/All-mail_voting#States_with_
existing.2C_permanent_automatic_mail-in_ballot_systems
[https://perma.cc/B3WM-ZCFB]
(noting that by November 2020, “Five states—Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah, and Washington—
conduct what are commonly referred to as all-mail elections”).
39 See, e.g., 1 PHIL KEISLING, VOTERS’ PAMPHLET 67 (1998) (citing fraud as an argument
against adopting all-mail voting), available for download at https://digital.osl.state.or.us/islandora/
object/osl%3A64375 [https://perma.cc/5ETE-F6BE].
40 See Elaine Kamarck & Christine Stenglein, Low Rates of Fraud in Vote-by-Mail States Show
the Benefits Outweigh the Risks, BROOKINGS INST. (June 2, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/
33
34
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Note, the administration of all-mail elections in these states prior to
COVID-19 insulated them from the need to quickly change their preexisting election systems and to engage in any absentee ballot deadline
litigation resulting therefrom.41
iii.

Quick Expansion Due to COVID-19

For the forty-five states that did not have all-mail election
procedures in place prior to COVID-19’s arrival in the United States, the
pandemic caused state officials to scramble to make voting safer than the
traditional method of in-person voting on Election Day.42 Making voting
by mail easier—either through postmark and/or deadline extensions or by
other means—was an obvious choice for certain states as politically
varied as Mississippi and New Jersey.43 While the fight over whether
such changes will remain permanent is just beginning as of this writing,44
these COVID-conscious changes often did not assuage litigants from

blog/fixgov/2020/06/02/low-rates-of-fraud-in-vote-by-mail-states-show-the-benefits-outweighthe-risks [https://perma.cc/B9M7-2HH4] (finding that out of 15,476,519 mail ballots cast in
Oregon since 2000 and prior to the 2020 presidential election, fourteen instances of attempted mail
fraud occurred, or a rate of roughly 0.0000009%).
41 See supra note 12. One reason for a lack of absentee ballot deadline litigation in these states
is that such cases likely would not have succeeded on equal protection grounds because of the preexisting strength of the vote-by-mail system. See id. (showing that among Colorado, Hawaii,
Oregon, Utah, and Washington, only one lawsuit was filed challenging the states’ pre-existing voteby-mail systems); see Griffin v. Hawaii, No. 20-CV-00298-DKW-KJM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
230530, at *2 (D. Haw. Dec. 8, 2020) (dismissing suit on standing and mootness grounds). For a
better understanding of the legal arguments present in these cases, see also Section I.C.i.1’s
discussion of the equal protection arguments litigants often assert in absentee ballot litigation
deadline cases.
42 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
43 Changes to Election Dates, Procedures, and Administration in Response to the Coronavirus
(COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_
procedures,_and_administration_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020
[https://perma.cc/W3BL-NJN5].
44 In 2021, several Republican state legislatures moved to curtail voting access in states that
had temporarily eased ballot access due to COVID. See, e.g., Stephen Gruber-Miller, Gov. Kim
Reynolds Signs Law Shortening Iowa’s Early and Election Day Voting, DES MOINES REG. (Mar.
9, 2021, 10:44 AM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2021/03/08/iowagovernor-kim-reynolds-signs-law-shortening-early-voting-closing-polls-earlier-election-day/
6869317002 [https://perma.cc/7NZN-MEHE] (“Iowa is among a national wave of Republican-led
states whose leaders have expressed concerns about the integrity of the 2020 elections . . . . States
such as Florida and Georgia have undertaken high-profile efforts to limit absentee voting after the
practice surged in 2020.”); see also Stephen Fowler & David Armstrong, 16 Years Later, Georgia
Lawmakers Flip Views on Absentee Voting, GA. PUB. BROAD. (Mar. 7, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://www.gpb.org/news/2021/03/07/16-years-later-georgia-lawmakers-flip-views-on-absenteevoting [https://perma.cc/Q6QE-BXWT].
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attempting to use the courts to achieve greater ballot access for voters.45
Thus, in a country with at least fifty-one separate sets of election laws
covering a single federal election, the United States’ political structure
was poorly positioned to resist an onslaught of COVID-related election
litigation.46
B.

The State of Vote-by-Mail Law and the Pre-COVID Incentives for
Litigation
i.

Current Law

At the state level, no two states’ absentee ballot laws are identical,
and ballot postmark and deadline provisions can vary widely.47 For
instance, in certain states, an absentee ballot will only count if a voter
obtains either multiple witness signatures or a notary public’s
autograph.48 To understand the origins of such burdensome requirements,
Justice Kagan has counseled that election law analysis cannot be divorced
from evaluating lawmakers’ underlying political incentives.49 That is to
say, how loose or restrictive a state’s absentee ballot laws were preCOVID is reflective of which procedures and policies state legislative
majorities deemed beneficial to their political interests at the time of

45 Ivan Pereira, Voting Rights Legislation Across Country Looks to Both Restrict, Expand
Access, ABC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2021, 8:00 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/voting-rightslegislation-country-restrict-expand-access/story?id=75473644 [https://perma.cc/D5HR-MZZG];
see also Section I.C’s discussion of plaintiffs’ claims.
46 This is not to assert that courts themselves were necessarily overwhelmed by the litigation.
Rather, with a lack of uniformity in state law around absentee balloting, there were simply more
fora for litigants to challenge various rules. Research suggests that uniform state acts promulgated
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) reduce litigation
costs by reducing forum shopping. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis
of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138 (1996).
47 See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 36 (showing each state’s disparate
voting rules in place for the 2020 presidential election).
48 VOPP: Table 14: How States Verify Voted Absentee Ballots, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopptable-14-how-states-verify-voted-absentee.aspx [https://perma.cc/J387-EGAR] (listing Rhode
Island, Alabama, and North Carolina as states requiring two witnesses prior to any pandemicrelated changes to voting rules). Local officials in two of these three states were formerly unable to
change any voting regulations without U.S. Justice Department approval until the Supreme Court
gutted the Voting Rights Act of 1965’s preclearance mechanism in Shelby County v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529 (2013); see Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 11,
2020), https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 [https://perma.cc/
M595-9TMS].
49 See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature (DNC), 141 S. Ct. 28, 43 (2020)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (mem.) (arguing that in relation to election law, “politicians’ incentives often
conflict with voters’ interests”).
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adoption.50 Thus, the patchwork of state absentee ballot laws appears to
be federalism at work, which has become net harmful because it provides
federal courts more opportunities to meddle in ruling on these laws.51
Stated differently, states have been prolific in utilizing their Elections
Clause power, while Congress has not.52
Given this Note’s call for a national overhaul of absentee ballot
deadline laws, it is unsurprising that federal law regarding the practice
mostly regulates the military and other federal personnel rather than a
majority of civilians.53 While federal law on absentee balloting is limited
given states’ traditional authority over the subject, statutes such as
UOCAVA have served as drivers of voter enfranchisement where state
law had historically proved insufficient.54 In fact, UOCAVA’s generous
week-after-Election Day ballot arrival deadline provision has been the
basis of at least one petition in state court to extend an absentee ballot
deadline.55

50 See, e.g., Frank Cerabino, Mail-In Voting in Florida Deserves a Bi-Partisan Stamp of
Approval, PALM BEACH POST (June 30, 2020, 5:32 PM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/
news/columns/2020/06/30/cerabino-mail-in-voting-in-florida-deserves-bi-partisan-stamp-ofapproval/112301672 [https://perma.cc/DG3X-LKJ6] (noting that a Republican governor and
Republican-led state legislature spearheaded Florida’s 2002 transition to no-excuse absentee
voting, and that the state Republican Party has since promoted its use to benefit statewide
Republican candidates).
51 See infra text accompanying notes 62–65.
52 Absent Congress exercising its power under the second subclause of the Elections Clause,
state legislatures have near free rein to determine election rules. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
53 See supra text accompanying note 29; see also 52 U.S.C. § 20303; 39 U.S.C. § 3406
(containing UOCAVA free postage and backup absentee ballot provisions).
54 See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 28, at 485 (“Much of federal election reform legislation
focuses on reforming the election day polling place, and since . . . the trend is toward voting away
from the polling place, a substantial percentage of voters will not receive the full benefit of these
reforms.”). To illustrate UOCAVA’s attempt to expand the franchise, the law established the
Federal Voter Assistance Program (FVAP), which provides military service members with
information on everything they need to know about casting an absentee ballot under the law, and a
resource which traditionally exists for civilians at the state level. See Voting Assistance Guide, FED.
VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, https://www.fvap.gov/guide [https://perma.cc/A8A9-WXR4];
see also, e.g., Absentee and Early Voting, VA. DEP’T OF ELECTIONS,
https://www.elections.virginia.gov/casting-a-ballot/absentee-voting
[https://perma.cc/A8F8DDA2].
55 Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 353, 371 (Pa. 2020) (granting petitioner
an injunction in part; absentee ballot arrival deadline extension of three days granted, but petitioner
had asked for a week based on UOCAVA’s arrival deadline), cert. denied sub nom. Republican
Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid (Boockvar), 141 S. Ct. 732 (2021). Veronica Degraffenreid became
acting Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania following former Secretary Kathy
Boockvar’s resignation in February 2021. See Maggie Mancini, Gov. Wolf Replaces Acting
Secretary of State Ahead of His Final Year in Office, PHILLY VOICE (Dec. 29, 2021),
https://www.phillyvoice.com/gov-wolf-replaces-acting-state-secretary-final-year-office
[https://perma.cc/MCP6-WU62].
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Litigation Driven by Electoral Power Politics

The best way to understand the legal battles over postmark and
arrival deadlines is to first evaluate the political forces behind them.
These include the “Blue Shift” phenomenon, a term coined in a paper by
Edward Foley and Charles Stewart.56 In recent twenty-first century
federal elections, both Republican and Democratic operatives have
adopted a general perception that absentee ballots that are postmarked
and received closer to their respective deadlines disproportionally benefit
Democratic candidates, and Foley and Stewart’s research gives statistical
validity to this view.57 In fact, such a phenomenon proved pivotal to
California Democrats in close Federal House races in 2018.58
Simply put, as a general matter, the looser a state’s postmark and
arrival deadlines are, the more likely Democratic candidates are to
benefit.59 If the close margins in the 2018 California House elections are
any guide, then there are tremendous incentives for both parties to litigate
the legal issues around ballot postmark and arrival deadlines, even if
those incentives do not align with voters’ best interests.60 Thus, for
Democrats, their litigation goals have been, inter alia, to extend
postmark/reception criteria and deadlines when possible, while

56 Edward B. Foley & Charles Stewart III, Explaining the Blue Shift in Election Canvassing, 1
J. POL. INSTS. & POL. ECON. 239 (2020).
57 See id. at 248–51, 257 (“Votes added to tallies in the days following the election come
primarily from three sources: (1) corrections and late returns submitted by outlying jurisdictions,
(2) provisional ballots, and (3) mail ballots. If any of these three sources disproportionately consist
of Democratic voters, or Democratic regions within the states, and if any of them has grown
sufficiently large in magnitude over time, it would not take a conspiracy among election
administrators for a persistent blue shift to develop. . . . [T]here appears to have been a tendency
for Democrats to disproportionately cast provisional and mail ballots in 2016, [thus producing a
Blue Shift.]”).
58 Yimeng Li, Michelle Hyun & R. Michael Alvarez, Why Do Election Results Change After
Election Day? The “Blue Shift” in California Elections, APSA PREPRINTS 4 (2021) (explaining
that by three weeks after Election Day, results in California looked markedly different in
Democrats’ favor than on Election night). This content is a preprint and has not yet been peerreviewed.
59 This was exactly the phenomenon in California in 2018. See id.
60 See supra note 58 at 19 (noting that two House seats “flipped” due to the post-Election Day
Blue Shift). See also supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note 61.
The Blue Shift played a pivotal role in how the public internalized election results in crucial 2020
states such as Pennsylvania, where President Biden did not take a lead in vote counting until
multiple days after the election. See Pennsylvania Presidential Election Results, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/results-pennsylvania-president.html
[https://perma.cc/R2BZ-J2PV] (showing a blue shift between the time when 50% and 100% of the
expected vote was reported in Pennsylvania).
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Republicans have recently sought to limit when and which mail ballots
may be counted and how they may be received.61
So long as Congress does not act to make it more difficult for
litigants to chip at the edges of each state’s absentee ballot deadline laws,
this incentive structure is unlikely to change.62 As a result, there is an
intractable problem of growing litigation around mail balloting deadlines,
as one political party views a certain practice or existing legal structure
as providing an inherent advantage or disadvantage in an election.63 This
creates a two-part legal problem: (1) new circuit splits while federal
elections are already underway,64 and (2) judicial activism on behalf of
judges who may rule in accordance with their pre-existing political
ideologies when deciding an election law dispute.65
C.

The Run-Up to Election Day 2020: What Happened in Court?
i.

Legal Arguments and Applicable Case Law

1.

Equal Protection and Constitutional Balancing in the Context of
Voting Rights
Although the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee the right to vote
anywhere in its plain language,66 the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
voting as a “fundamental interest” under its Fourteenth Amendment equal
61 See, e.g., Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 371–72, 380 (Pa. 2020). While
Boockvar is one of many cases concerning these issues, both parties were able to walk away with
at least one of their litigation goals accomplished. For Republicans, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania rejected the counting of so-called “naked ballots,” while Democrats received an
extension deadline (three days) that they had been seeking from the onset of litigation. Id.
62 The New Abnormal with Molly Jong-Fast & Rick Wilson, Is This When Ivanka Will Run
Against Little Marco Rubio?, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 11, 2020), https://play.acast.com/s/the-newabnormal/isthiswhenivankawillrunagainstlittlemarcorubio[https://perma.cc/7FE9-VKYN]
(featuring Podcast guest and Democratic elections lawyer Marc Elias explaining that only Congress
can step in to reduce the rising flood of election-related litigation).
63 Id.
64 See infra Section I.C.ii.
65 The Supreme Court arguably gave license to an increased amount of judicial activism in
election law cases following its decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore: Thoughts on Professor Amar’s Analysis, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 969, 970 (2009) (“Although unusual in its national significance, Bush v. Gore is typical in
terms of two crucial points: first, Justices have tremendous discretion in deciding constitutional
cases; and second, how that discretion is exercised is frequently, if not inevitably, a product of the
Justices’ life experiences and ideology.”); see also Mark S. Brodin, Bush v. Gore: The Worst (or
at Least Second-to-the-Worst) Supreme Court Decision Ever, 12 NEV. L.J. 563 (2012).
66 Several constitutional amendments (including the Fourteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth,
and Twenty-Sixth) have expanded voting rights by limiting state power, yet none of these expressly
guarantee the right to vote as an explicit, standalone right. See NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 805 (Saul Levmore et al. eds., 20th ed. 2019).
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protection jurisprudence, which usually triggers heightened scrutiny.67
Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that the act of voting is a form
of expression and association that the First Amendment protects.68 Given
this nexus between the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme
Court has instructed lower federal courts to first determine whether a
burden on voting rights is so high as to require strict scrutiny review, or
so unimpactful as to fall back into the realm of rational basis review.69 If
a district court deems neither standard to be appropriate, as is often the
case, then that court must balance the plaintiff’s claimed injuries
concerning these rights against the state’s interest in maintaining the
voting-related provision or regulation at issue.70 Over time, federal courts
applying this intermediate balancing test have referred to it as “AndersonBurdick” balancing.71 Essentially, the test has enabled Justices who reject
the rigidity of rational basis versus strict scrutiny review to employ a
more malleable standard, though the Supreme Court has yet to produce a
majority opinion relying on Anderson-Burdick balancing.72
Interestingly, some litigation in the 2020 election cycle has
concerned this balancing approach, whereas other cases involved

67 This recognition began during the Warren Court’s overall expansion of voting rights. See
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down Virginia’s $1.50 poll tax);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a New York law limiting
eligibility to vote in local school district elections to those who owned or leased taxable real
property within the district or were parents (or legal guardians) of children within the district).
Notably, these decisions employed a standard of review closer to strict scrutiny, whereas AndersonBurdick balancing employs a test somewhere in between mere rational basis review and strict
scrutiny. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
69 Daniel Bruce, Is It Time for SCOTUS to Revisit the Anderson-Burdick Test?: Insights from
the Challenge to West Virginia’s Ballot Order Statute, WM. & MARY L. SCH. ELECTION L. SOC’Y
(Nov. 18, 2020), http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/2020/11/18/time-scotus-revisit-anderson-burdicktest-insights-challenge-west-virginias-ballot-order-statute [https://perma.cc/PQ38-KFA6]. For a
general overview of the differences between rational, intermediate, and strict scrutiny, see Brett
Snider, Challenging Laws: 3 Levels of Scrutiny Explained, FINDLAW (Jan. 27, 2014, 9:05 AM),
https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/law-and-life/challenging-laws-3-levels-of-scrutinyexplained [https://perma.cc/4WB2-VR9K].
70 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (articulating the balancing test to
invalidate a burdensome candidate filing deadline in Ohio); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
428, 433 (1992) (rejecting petitioner’s request to apply strict scrutiny review and subsequently
applying Anderson-Burdick balancing to Hawaii’s state constitutional ban on write-in voting and
sustaining the provision).
71 See, e.g., DNC, 141 S. Ct. 28, 33–34 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (mem.) (discussing
Anderson-Burdick balancing).
72 The most significant Supreme Court case analyzing a state election law using the AndersonBurdick balancing approach is Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
However, only a plurality of Justices endorsed the Court’s application of the balancing approach in
that case. Id. at 190 (plurality opinion).
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challenging ballot deadline extensions on other grounds.73 In any event,
there is little doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic opened the door to an
increased number of reasonable equal protection claims under this
general framework, even though many were unsuccessful at varying
levels of the federal court system.74
2. The Purcell Principle
Arguably the most influential Supreme Court case affecting
absentee ballot deadline litigation is Purcell v. Gonzalez.75 In Purcell, the
Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for
greenlighting a district court’s injunction that had temporarily blocked a
new and restrictive Arizona voter identification law from taking effect.76
As a result, Purcell stands for the general notion that federal courts should
not change election rules shortly before federal elections.77 While this
idea initially may seem both logical and simple, it has often been relied
on as a cudgel to bat down valid equal protection claims that should be
analyzed primarily under Anderson-Burdick balancing instead.78 Thus, in
some ways, Purcell is the off-ramp that saves federal judges from needing
to justify a rejection of expanding the franchise—when presented with a
valid argument for doing so—where the state interest asserted by
defendants is often preventing voting fraud, which is empirically
extremely rare.79
Even if one accepts the growing influence of Purcell on the election
law docket in federal courts, the principle is hard to apply days or weeks

73 See infra Section I.C.ii.3 (discussing how Pennsylvania’s deadline extension rested upon
state constitutional law grounds).
74 See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2020) (staying the district
court decision in holding that Texas’s sixty-five-year-old threshold requirement for voting absentee
likely does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 491 F. Supp.
3d 1076, 1144–49 (N.D. Ala. 2020) (applying the balancing framework to a witness requirement
for absentee ballots), stay granted in part by People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State, No. 20-13695B, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 33371, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 13, 2020); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.
Bostelmann (DNC), 977 F.3d 639, 641–43 (7th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
75 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
76 Id. at 4–5; see Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
427, 428 (2016).
77 Purcell, 549 U.S. at 2–5. The decision does not specify the time horizon for when federal
courts should no longer intervene in federal elections. See generally id. Of course, this omitted
detail is crucial, and it therefore comes as no surprise that one election law expert has called the
Supreme Court’s Purcell decision a “rush[] to judgment on an unfamiliar issue.” Daniel P. Tokaji,
Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1065, 1067 (2007).
78 To illustrate how application of the Purcell principle warps how judges and Justices would
likely otherwise rule on valid constitutional claims, see Hasen, supra note 76, at 456–59.
79 Michael D. Gilbert, The Problem of Voter Fraud, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 746 n.37 (2015)
(noting that reported UFO sightings are more common than validated instances of voter fraud).
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before federal elections conclude.80 At the very least, federal courts have
recently weaponized the principle such that cases relying on a Purcell
analysis change the very election rules that the principle itself supposedly
aims to keep from changing.81 Of course, countless legal rules are subject
to dueling interpretations by judges, but if there was ever a principle in
need of uniform application to reduce confusion among voters and not to
disrupt election administration, it is this one.82 In other words, the spirit
of Purcell should be inscribed into federal statutory law with clear
language, or courts should do away with applying the principle all
together.83
ii.

Making Sense of a Contradictory Bag of Outcomes

In this subsection, the North Carolina,84 Minnesota,85
Pennsylvania,86 and Wisconsin87 ballot deadline cases deserve specific
attention for a few reasons, despite other choices.88 First, the two major

80 Disagreements regarding the application of the Purcell principle animate judges’ opinions
in the North Carolina, Minnesota, and Wisconsin cases because they all originated in federal rather
than state court. See infra Sections I.C.ii.1 (North Carolina), I.C.ii.2 (Minnesota), and I.C.ii.4
(Wisconsin). The Pennsylvania case reached federal court after originating in the state system,
meaning that Purcell does not apply to a case involving judicial rulings at the state level. Pa.
Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 352–55 (Pa. 2020).
81 See infra Section I.C.ii.2 (demonstrating that Simon is an apt illustration of Purcell’s
backwardness).
82 See Tokaji, supra note 77, at 1094 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s intervention in Purcell was
anything but constructive or clarifying. . . . [I]ts discussion of the constitutional issues at play
provides ambiguous guidance for the lower courts. The Court’s opinion also demonstrated little
regard or interest in the practical realities of election administration practices, either in Arizona or
in other states that may be implicated by Purcell’s ruling.”).
83 See infra Part III (containing a discussion of potential jurisdiction-limiting measures, which
could include a date after which no appellate court may change rules for a federal election,
regardless of Purcell).
84 Moore v. Circosta (Moore), 494 F. Supp. 3d 289 (M.D.N.C. 2020); Wise v. Circosta (Wise),
978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). These cases have two different names to reflect one of the
intervenors (Patsy J. Wise). However, they arise from the same set of facts and are analyzed as the
same case in this Note. See infra text accompanying notes 97 and 98.
85 Carson v. Simon (Simon), 978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
86 See supra note 55.
87 See supra notes 14, 49, and 74 for the shifting names (depending on the stage of the case) of
the same absentee ballot deadline litigation in Wisconsin, collectively analyzed as DNC in this
Note.
88 See, e.g., Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 978 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(reversing district court injunction which had granted plaintiff’s equal protection claim to extend
absentee ballot arrival deadline for the general election). Unlike the states mentioned above, Indiana
has not been a competitive state at the presidential level since 2008. See Bill Ruthhart & Jonathon
Berlin, Campaign Trail Tracker: Where Trump, Biden and Their Running Mates Have Traveled in
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2020 presidential campaigns and nonpartisan election handicappers
viewed these states as extremely competitive.89 Additionally, each one
involved some form of adjudication by either a federal circuit court or the
U.S. Supreme Court less than ten days before Election Day.90 When
analyzed both separately and comparatively, these cases demonstrate the
practical unworkability inherent in these rulings, and present a strong
microcosm of why congressional intervention to reduce federal court
involvement in absentee ballot deadline law is so important following
2020.91 Further, throughout 2020, federal courts repeatedly handed down
election rule-changing decisions that bred the very confusing uncertainty
against which Purcell counsels.92
1. North Carolina
Of the four states surveyed, the North Carolina examples, Moore v.
Circosta and Wise v. Circosta,93 are the only cases where a federal
appellate court94 allowed an absentee ballot deadline extension to stand

Presidential Race’s Final Weeks, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 5, 2020, 4:59 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-viz-presidential-campaign-trail-tracker-20200917edspdit2incbfnopchjaelp3uu-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/8YXY-GRMP]; 2020 Electoral
College Map, REAL CLEAR POLS. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2020/
president/2020_elections_electoral_college_map.html [https://perma.cc/88E5-9HXB].
89 See Ruthhart & Berlin, supra note 88; 2020 Electoral College Map, supra note 88.
90 For an exhaustive case-by-case timeline of 2020 election litigation, including the dates of
each court order, see BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 12.
91 Additionally, underneath the hood of these decisions is a disagreement between Supreme
Court Justices as to what is the meaning of the term “Legislature” in the Constitution. See text
accompanying Section I.C.ii.3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing against the State Board of Election’s authority to change ballot
deadlines because the Board is not a part of the North Carolina General Assembly within Justice
Gorsuch’s understanding of the meaning of “Legislature”). Notably, Justice Barrett did not play a
role in adjudicating Moore. Given the Court’s sharp division over this question, resolution of this
issue is likely best left to cases fully briefed and argued before the Court rather than when
adjudicating emergency petitions in deeply partisan cases. If this cannot be accomplished due to
time constraints, a deeper post-hoc analysis would still be helpful. See Hasen, supra note 76, at
461–63 (“The benefits of giving reasons are many. Reasons will help lower courts use the right
standards in election cases, rather than having to try to read tea leaves from unexplained Court
orders. Following the Court’s normal procedural regularity in election cases will bolster the
legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public, something especially important in controversial
cases, such as election cases. Following usual and articulated rules may also discipline Justices into
deciding similar cases alike, regardless of the identity of the parties.” (footnotes omitted)).
92 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (“Court orders affecting elections, especially
conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain
away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.”). Purcell was decided just
over two weeks before the 2006 midterm congressional elections. See id.
93 Moore, 494 F. Supp. 3d 289 (M.D.N.C. 2020); Wise, 978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
See supra note 84.
94 For purposes of this Note, the U.S. Supreme Court counts as a “federal appellate court.”
Where distinctions are necessary, the terms “Circuit Court” and “Supreme Court” will be used.
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based on a lower federal court’s decision.95 The North Carolina litigation
initially began with elderly citizen plaintiffs seeking, inter alia, an
absentee ballot deadline extension that would enable such votes to be
counted up to ten days after Election Day due in part to COVID-19.96
When the parties reached an agreement on a slightly shorter extension,
the Speaker of North Carolina’s House of Representatives, Tim Moore,
attacked the agreement as a plaintiff,97 but the Fourth Circuit ultimately
let the first suit’s consent judgment stand.98 Notably, Moore and his colitigants sought to upend a unanimous bipartisan consent decree, agreed
to between the defendant state elections board and the original
plaintiffs.99 Further, the trial court-approved consent decree highlighted
that the North Carolina State Board of Elections had unilaterally moved
to extend such deadlines in the past due to hurricanes.100
Understanding this extension is important because it demonstrates
some of the tension between it and Democratic National Committee v.
Wisconsin State Legislature in terms of the Supreme Court’s deference
towards federal district courts and Purcell’s operability and bearing on
them.101 Importantly, the district court judges in both cases initially
allowed for extensions to each states’ absentee ballot deadlines, but the
Wise decision in North Carolina was based on a consent decree, whereas
95 See also Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 1451 (2021)
(mem.); cf. Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 386 (Pa. 2020) (allowing lower state
court’s absentee ballot deadline extension to stand).
96 Complaint at 24–27, 40, N.C. All. for Retired Ams. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 20CVS-8881, 2020 N.C. Super. LEXIS 27 (Super. Ct. N.C. Oct. 2, 2020), available at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e909f4422f7a40a188de597/t/5f3195adacb31f23dbc554b3/
1597085101270/2020.08.10+-+NC+Alliance+for+Retired+Americans+v.+State++Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U9W-NF8J].
97 See generally Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Moore v. Circosta, No. 20CV-507-D (E.D.N.C. Oct. 3, 2020), available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/
gov.uscourts.nced.182692/gov.uscourts.nced.182692.1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ2M-S5G6].
98 Wise, 978 F.3d at 103 (“As the district court wisely recognized, there is no need, in the middle
of an ongoing election, for the federal courts to intervene into the voting affairs of North
Carolina.”).
99 Most of the Fourth Circuit, while sitting en banc, also looked unfavorably on a litigant
attempting to invalidate a bi-partisan agreement surrounding election rules. Id. at 97.
100 The Court noted that the North Carolina State Board of Elections undertook this course of
action both in 2018 and 2019. Id. at 97 n.2. Interestingly, this line of reasoning demonstrates that a
strong majority of the Fourth Circuit places the COVID-19 pandemic in the category of a force
majeure type event necessitating administrative, rather than judicial, intervention to protect equal
protection interests. See id. at 95 (noting that the majority opinion gained twelve judges’ approval
over only three dissenters).
101 DNC, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (mem.) (“While the Pennsylvania
applications implicated the authority of state courts to apply their own constitutions to election
regulations, this case involves federal intrusion on state lawmaking processes. Different bodies of
law and different precedents govern these two situations and require, in these particular
circumstances, that we allow the modification of election rules in Pennsylvania but not
Wisconsin.”).
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the subsequently overturned DNC extension in Wisconsin was based on
a judge’s decision alone.102
While the Supreme Court ultimately let the Fourth Circuit’s Wise
decision stand without explanation,103 the sharp disagreements between
the court of appeals’ Wise majority and dissent demonstrate both the
difficulty and contradictions inherent in applying the Purcell principle.104
Commendably, the majority sets out a clear line of reasoning focused
primarily on two issues: what triggers the “status quo” for Purcell
purposes,105 and whether the Moore plaintiffs were likely to have success
on the merits of their equal protection argument.106 Unlike their
dissenting colleagues, the Fourth Circuit majority relied on the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Andino v. Middleton to establish that the “status
quo” begins with a state’s action, not an interfering district court’s
injunction.107
Alternatively, the dissent sought to extend Purcell to the actions of
state courts on the theory that if the case only applied to federal court
decisions, litigants would nonetheless run off to state courts for the same

102 See N.C. All. for Retired Ams. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 20-CVS-8881, 2020 N.C.
Super. LEXIS 27 (Super. Ct. N.C. Oct. 2, 2020); infra note 149.
103 See Wise v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020) (mem.) (denying application for stay of lower
courts’ decisions).
104 See Wise, 978 F.3d at 98. As is typical for emergency orders, the ruling on application for
injunctive relief simply states which Justice referred the matter and that there was a denial. Wise,
141 S. Ct. at 658. Considering the time-sensitive nature of these decisions, at least one scholar has
urged the Supreme Court to give at least barebones explanations for its reasoning. See Hasen, supra
note 76, at 461–63. In the meantime, one can only assume that a majority of Supreme Court Justices
either (1) agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s decision and/or reasoning; and/or (2) refused to rock the
boat themselves at such a late stage in the election, as the Court released the North Carolina decision
six days prior to the end of the general election.
105 For the purposes of the Court’s analysis, “status quo” means a backward-looking date at
which the Purcell analysis starts, or, in other words, at what point of action on a particular date a
reviewing court should decide that any more changes to election rules would constitute a violation
of the Purcell principle. The Fourth Circuit majority chose October 2, the date that a state court
approved the North Carolina State Board of Elections consent decree with the original plaintiffs.
The U.S. District Court below also agreed. Wise, 978 F.3d at 98–99 (citing Moore, 494 F. Supp. 3d
289, 322 (M.D.N.C. 2020)).
106 The new attacking plaintiffs were alleging that the consent decree, which extended the state’s
absentee ballot receipt deadline, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Complaint for Declaratory
& Injunctive Relief at 17, Moore, 494 F. Supp. 3d 289 (No. 20-CV-182).
107 Wise, 978 F.3d at 98 (citing Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020)). Andino concerned
South Carolina’s witness requirement for absentee voting and was decided on October 5. See
Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 10. Thus, to clarify an important but unclear principle, the Wise court relied
on a two-week-old precedent from another emergency shadow docket case which also bred
unnecessary confusion for voters in South Carolina. See, e.g., Michelle Ye Hee Lee & Stephanie
Hunt, Supreme Court Order on Mail Ballots in South Carolina Sparks Worries About Voter
Confusion, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/south-carolinamail-ballots-signature/2020/10/06/65bd6630-07e8-11eb-859b-f9c27abe638d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/4F8T-V2FK].
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relief that would be denied to them in federal court.108 In essence, the
dissenters argued that the Purcell principle is useless if it is only applied
in federal courts, in part because it promotes forum shopping.109 While
this may practically be true, the majority notes that the dissent found no
legal basis—in case law or statute—for this assertion.110
Crucially, the dissent’s rigid argument does little to rid itself of its
underlying practical irony. The dissent claims that the North Carolina
State Board of Elections undertook illegal action via its consent decree
with the first set of plaintiffs while “hundreds of thousands of North
Carolinians have already voted in important elections.”111 However, at
the same time, the dissent sought to change the rules of the election for a
second time—the very action it was complaining about—once millions
of North Carolinians had already voted in the name of ending supposed
“chaos.”112 Varying interpretations of Purcell are nothing new,113 yet the
abuse of the principle demonstrates the federal judiciary’s dangerous
folly of interpreting election law on the eve of federal elections—either
the majority or dissenting opinion can be easily read by the general public
as judges choosing their preferred election rule outcome, only then to
return to precedent and massaging it to justify their desired results.114 On
108 Wise, 978 F.3d at 116–17 (Wilkinson & Agee, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]here is no principled
reason why this rule should not apply against interferences by state courts and agencies. The victim
of a last-minute interference, whatever its source, is the same: a federal election.”).
109 See id.
110 See Section I.C.ii.3’s discussion of litigation in Pennsylvania (noting plaintiffs in Boockvar
brought only state law claims in state court). Purcell “traditionally” has only been applied against
federal court intervention. See Wise, 978 F.3d at 117 (Wilkinson & Agee, JJ., dissenting); id. at 99
(majority opinion) (“[O]ur dissenting colleagues’ assertion that ‘there is no principled reason why
this rule should not apply against interferences by state courts and agencies,’ . . . flips Purcell on
its head: our colleagues justify federal court intervention—the one thing Purcell clearly counsels
against—based on their own notions of what the Supreme Court should have said in Purcell.”).
111 Wise, 978 F.3d at 105, 117 (Wilkinson & Agee, JJ., dissenting).
112 Id. For detailed early-vote data as of 4:40 AM the day of the Wise decision, see N.C. Absentee
Statistics for the 2020 General Election, N.C. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/Press/NC%20Absentee%20Stats%
20for%202020%20General%20Election/Absentee_Stats_2020General_10202020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6AH-CHWZ].
113 Hasen, supra note 76 (discussing Purcell-related litigation during 2014). The article’s
argument that Purcell has swallowed the constitutional election-related claims before federal courts
remains as important as ever today.
114 Relatedly, both legal commentators and even one Supreme Court Justice have conceded that
public perception of the Supreme Court as a political entity increased in recent years. See Ian
Millhiser, Kagan Warns that the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Is in Danger, THINKPROGRESS
(Sept. 17, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/justice-kagan-warns-that-thesupreme-courts-legitimacy-is-in-danger-2de1192d5636 [https://perma.cc/L62K-GRAM]; Daniel
Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 160 (2019)
(showing that “polling data provides some evidence that much of the public sees the Justices as
political actors”). Even though the analysis above concerns the Fourth Circuit rather than the
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top of this, the Supreme Court did not make public its decision to let the
Fourth Circuit’s decision stand until less than a week before Election
Day.115
Nonetheless, what make the Moore and Wise decisions somewhat
unique is that the very state action being protected under the Purcell
principle happened to be an expansion, rather than a restriction, of the
franchise.116 While the Fourth Circuit’s decision theoretically should
serve as a model for other federal courts—applying Purcell neutrally to
preserve or even expand the franchise—it stands in contrast to other
decisions which have weaponized poorly developed doctrine or ignored
it all together to restrict ballot deadlines, and therefore voting option
flexibility—a position for which the Wise dissent vociferously
advocated.117
2. Minnesota
There are several factual similarities between Carson v. Simon and
Wise, yet their diametrically opposite outcomes illustrate the need to
federally standardize absentee ballot deadlines.118 Similar to North
Carolina, the absentee ballot deadline extension (in Minnesota’s case, one
week) resulted from a consent decree between an initial group of
plaintiffs and Minnesota’s Secretary of State.119 Where the cases stand in
stark contrast, however, is that the Eighth Circuit majority in Simon used
much of the same reasoning—that the consent decree itself usurped
legislative power—as the dissent in Wise.120 Yet the most eyebrowraising part of the Simon opinion is that the majority in effect ignores
Purcell and Andino as binding precedent by arguing that, under the U.S.

Supreme Court, federal intermediate appellate court decisions are most in the public eye around
election time, supporting the notion that such decisions can be viewed by the public through the
lens of desired political outcomes. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Federal Appeals
Courts Emerge as Crucial for Trump in Voting Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/17/us/politics/federal-appeals-courts-trump-voting.html
[https://perma.cc/W5BT-D5M2].
115 The Supreme Court issued its ruling on October 28, 2020. See Wise v. Circosta, 141 S Ct.
658 (2020) (mem.).
116 See N.C. All. for Retired Ams. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 20-CVS-8881, 2020 N.C.
Super. LEXIS 27 (Super. Ct. N.C. Oct. 2, 2020). North Carolina’s absentee ballot deadline was
initially extended via a consent decree. See Wise, 978 F.3d at 106–07 (Wilkinson & Agee, JJ.,
dissenting) (describing the terms of the consent decree).
117 See, e.g., Simon, 978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); see also Wise, 978 F.3d at 104–
117 (Wilkinson & Agee, JJ., dissenting).
118 Simon, 978 F.3d at 1054–63. While not identical in reasoning, the spirits of the Wise dissent
and the Simon majority are essentially the same. Cf. Wise, 978 F.3d at 104–117 (Wilkinson & Agee,
JJ., dissenting) (rejecting state election rule changes emanating from consent decrees between
private parties and non-legislative state agencies as usurping state legislative power).
119 Simon, 978 F.3d at 1054.
120 Id. at 1054–63.
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Constitution, once a state legislature sets the status quo via lawmaking,
any rule changes related to election administration will thenceforth be
invalid.121 While this argument stands in contrast not only with the Wise
ruling, it also flies in the face of Purcell itself and any judicial restraint
embodied in the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.122 In other words,
there was no need for the Eighth Circuit majority to decide a question that
was constitutional in nature.123 Nonetheless, by doing so, the majority
found a way to apply the doctrine that best suited its desired outcome, as
the Fourth Circuit arguably did as well.124
Of course, circuit splits are bound to happen on all sorts of hot
button, politically charged issues;125 yet, as the Supreme Court has
counseled, election cases are unique in their time constraints and effect
121 Id. at 1062 (“The Purcell principle is a presumption against disturbing the status quo. The
question here is who sets the status quo? The Constitution’s answer is generally the state legislature.
And in the case of presidential elections, the Electors Clause vests power exclusively in the
legislature. In our case, the Minnesota Legislature set the status quo, the Secretary upset it, and it
is our duty, consistent with Purcell, to at least preserve the possibility of restoring it.”). Though the
majority purports to adhere to Purcell, it deals little with the fact that when the Minnesota Secretary
of State “upset” the status quo via a consent decree that Minnesota had agreed to in August, the
court’s decision came in late October, over a month after early voting had begun in between the
two reversals in election law. See id.; Amy Forliti, Court Hears Challenge to Minnesota Mail-in
Ballots Extension, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 27, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020donald-trump-virus-outbreak-elections-minnesota-d8042c923aa8c1abd67829357a756724
[https://perma.cc/UYC7-3HWS].
122 The majority could have relied on Purcell alone to avoid any constitutional analysis, rather
than analyzing the constitution and retrofitting Purcell into its interpretation thereof. See Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam) (“We underscore that we express no opinion here on
the correct disposition, after full briefing and argument . . . on the ultimate resolution of these
cases.”); id. at 6 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Allowing the election to proceed without enjoining the
statutory provisions at issue will provide the courts with a better record on which to judge their
constitutionality.”); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).
123 See note 122 and accompanying text.
124 See Simon, 978 F.3d at 1067–68 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s approach
to crafting injunctive relief as “novel” and noting “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an
election. . . . Nonetheless, this court has issued an order directing the Minnesota Secretary of State
to take specific action with respect to its election process for an election that is already under way.”
(internal quotations marks and citation omitted) (quoting Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020))); Neal Devins & Allison Orr Larsen, Weaponizing En
Banc, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (“From 2018–2020 there was a dramatic and strongly
statistically significant spike in both partisan splits and partisan reversals of en banc decisions—
more in both categories than we observed in any other time period over six decades.”). See also
supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. While Simon involved a three-judge panel rather than
an appellate court sitting en banc, it comes as little surprise that the two-to-one decision broke down
on partisan lines. See generally 978 F.3d 1051.
125 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663 (2015) (resolving a circuit split between
the Sixth Circuit and every other federal circuit that had addressed the exclusion of same-sex
couples from obtaining marriage licenses).
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on the public’s ability to participate in the electoral process.126 There is
therefore no justifiable legal reason why voters in North Carolina should
have a consent decree validated to extend absentee ballot receipt
deadlines, while voters in Minnesota should receive the opposite result
less than a week before a contentious federal election, as voters in both
states were choosing between at least four of the same candidates for
president and vice president.127
Moreover, specific to Simon, the dissent notes important practical
considerations and public interest concerns which should be at the
bedrock of adjudication of election law decisions, including avoiding
voter confusion and enabling as many citizens to vote as possible.128
Furthermore, the dissent correctly spells out concerns over confusion that
the majority brushes off as “inevitable post-election challenges.”129 For
example, while the majority argues that Minnesota’s Secretary of State’s
alleged usurpation of the state legislature’s power was the original
violation of Purcell, the dissent notes that for the one million sevenhundred thousand Minnesota voters, the consent decree’s absentee ballot
deadline extension instructions were the only form of notice and
directions that they had received from the state prior to the majority’s
ruling which disturbed those instructions.130 Further complicating
matters, given the decision’s timing—six days before voting ended—
potential Republican Electoral College electors brought this suit
attacking the consent decree.131 Because the Eighth Circuit panel reversed
the District Court’s ruling that the Electors did not have standing to
pursue their claims, Minnesotans did not know if the decision applied
only to sidelining votes for the national presidential election, or if all
Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Daniel P. Tokaji & Allison R. Hayward, The Role of Judges in Election Law, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 273, 275–76 (2011) (arguing that there are two scenarios in which judicial
intervention in election law cases is warranted: (1) where “a majority will seek to weaken a minority
of citizens” from exercising their voting rights and (2) when elected officials “promote their own
self-interest at the expense of the polity”). Here, in the absentee ballot deadline context, neither of
Tokaji and Hayward’s criteria apply to justify the Eighth Circuit’s invalidation of the consent
decree to extend the ballot deadline in that state. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes
122–123.
128 Simon, 978 F.3d at 1067 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (“The court’s injunctive relief will cause voter
confusion and undermine Minnesotans’ confidence in the election process, implicating both Purcell
concerns and the public interest inherent in having eligible citizens participate in state elections, as
well as causing potential harm for voters.”) (citing League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North
Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014)); see also infra Section III.C.
129 Simon, 978 F.3d at 1061 (majority opinion).
130 Id. at 1067 (Kelly, J., dissenting). Stated differently, the majority can assert whatever theory
of legislative power it likes, but its theory as applied to the facts on the ground in Minnesota belies
the experience of voters, all of whom had requested ballots under the pretense that they would be
counted if received by local elections officials by November 10. Thus, general election voters in
Minnesota were only experiencing one rule change, arguably in violation of Purcell.
131 Id. at 1054 (majority opinion).
126
127
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ballots received after November 3 would be invalid.132 This bred even
further “unnecessar[]y disrupti[on].”133 Finally, the ruling meant that
state election officials had to segregate ballots arriving after November
3, leaving a sizeable portion of voters in doubt as to the potential validity
of their votes.134
3. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar involved various state
law claims to ease restrictions on the absentee balloting process under the
state’s constitution, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania exercised its
“Extraordinary Jurisdiction” to extend the state’s absentee ballot receipt
deadline by three days for the presidential election.135 In appealing that
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Republican Party of
Pennsylvania first sought a stay, which the highest Court denied by an
evenly split four-to-four vote.136 In a last-ditch effort to prevent the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision from taking effect, petitioners
sought expedited consideration of their writ of certiorari on the
constitutional question of whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
had usurped its power to interpret that state’s constitution given the
meaning of the term “Legislature” in the Federal Constitution.137 As he
132 Id. at 1057–59 (ruling that the Electors had standing to bring their suit before the presidential
election, while not addressing the lingering issue of whether such standing would preclude an entire
ballot from counting, or only a vote cast for president). See also infra note 133.
133 Greta Kaul, What the Appeals Court’s Decision on Late-Arriving Ballots Means for
Minnesota—and Where Things Could Go from Here, MINNPOST (Oct. 30, 2020),
https://www.minnpost.com/elections/2020/10/what-the-appeals-courts-decision-on-late-arrivingballots-means-for-minnesota-and-where-things-could-go-from-here
[https://perma.cc/7QLKL5SH] (noting that the Eighth Circuit’s decision created the uncertainty of possible further postelection litigation).
134 See id.; see also Jeremiah Jacobsen & Chris Hrapsky, Court: Late-Arriving Minnesota
Absentee Ballots Must Be Separated, May Not Be Counted, KARE 11 (Oct. 31, 2020),
https://www.kare11.com/article/news/politics/elections/court-late-arriving-minnesota-absenteeballots-must-be-separated-may-not-be-counted/89-6dccc710-c1eb-46ea-8b92-4f6e12e5efe8
[https://perma.cc/F5M3-F8KT] (“The ruling casts doubt on whether absentee ballots received after
Nov. 3 will be counted, despite a state plan to continue to count absentee ballots received within
seven days of the election[.]”).
135 See supra note 61; Harvard Law Review, Recent Case: Pennsylvania Democratic Party v.
Boockvar, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 4, 2020), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/recent-case-_
pennsylvania-democratic-party-v-boockvar_ [https://perma.cc/8VQW-H4C2] (noting the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania’s exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction).
136 Pam Fessler, Supreme Court Rules Pennsylvania Can Count Ballots Received After Election
Day, NPR (Oct. 19, 2020, 7:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/19/922411176/supreme-courtrules-pennsylvania-can-count-ballots-received-after-election-day [https://perma.cc/5LNZ-VRJV]
(explaining Chief Justice Roberts siding with his liberal colleagues to allow the court’s ruling to
stand. The Court issued its ruling without comment).
137 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, 17, Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1
(2020) (No. 20-542), 2020 WL 6273543. Only four votes are needed for the Supreme Court to grant
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reluctantly approved of the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of petitioners’
motion to expedite, Justice Alito accused his colleagues of not acting
quickly enough to issue a stay of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
decision.138
The practical effect of both of these U.S. Supreme Court shadow
docket decisions was to leave the absentee ballot arrival deadline
extension in place, yet three U.S. Supreme Court Justices initially left the
door open to throwing out ballots that arrived after Election Day had such
votes become dispositive to the state’s presidential results.139 In the end,
President Biden won the state by a margin greater than the number of
absentee ballots that arrived during the three-day extension window,140
and on February 22, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the ultimate
constitutional question was therefore moot.141

a writ of certiorari. See Supreme Court Procedures, UNITED STATES CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/
activity-resources/supreme-1 [https://perma.cc/8PUE-9JTY].
138 Republican Party of Pa., 141 S. Ct. at 1–5 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court’s handling of
the important constitutional issue raised . . . has needlessly created conditions that could lead to
serious post-election problems.”).
139 Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Declines to Disturb Ballot Deadlines in North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2020, 10:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
supreme-court-won-t-hear-pennsylvania-ballot-case-before-election-11603920921
[https://perma.cc/T4L9-VDX6] (“Justice Alito cited [the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s decision
to segregate ballots received after election day] in his statement, saying that it would allow ‘a
targeted remedy,’ such as invalidating the late-delivered votes, should the court take up the case
after Election Day.”); see also Elizabeth Hardison & Stephen Caruso, U.S. Supreme Court Turns
Down Pa. Republicans’ Request to Halt Extended Ballot Deadline, PA. CAPITAL-STAR (Oct. 28,
2020, 7:20 PM), https://www.penncapital-star.com/blog/u-s-supreme-court-turns-down-parepublicans-request-to-halt-extended-ballot-deadline-report
[https://perma.cc/L5D2-BN4Z]
(noting how Justice Alito’s statement asserted a reserved right for the U.S. Supreme Court to
disqualify ballots arriving after Election Day if those ballots had become dispositive to the state’s
election results).
140 Jonathan Lai, Only 10,000 Pa. Mail Ballots Arrived After Election Day—Far Too Few to
Change the Result if Thrown Out, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/
politics/election/pennsylvania-mail-ballots-counted-deadline-supreme-court-20201111.html
[https://perma.cc/A9CV-XLQW]. See also Pennsylvania Presidential Election Results, supra note
60.
141 Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 732, 732 (2021) (mem.) (“The motions of Donald J. Trump for
President, Inc. for leave to intervene as petitioner are dismissed as moot. The motions of Thomas
J. Randolph, et al. for leave to intervene as respondents are dismissed as moot. . . . The petitions
for writs of certiorari are denied.”). Professor Rick Hasen believes that the U.S. Supreme Court
would ultimately like to address the core constitutional question present in the Pennsylvania case,
but it rejected the writ of certiorari in this instance because the case is so politically charged, and
the Court has no interest in putting the spotlight on itself in a case that could be seen as attempting
to undermine the results of the 2020 presidential election. Rick Hasen, Breaking and Analysis:
Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Cases Over Conduct of Election in Pennsylvania, With Justices
Alito, Gorsuch and Thomas Dissenting: A Ticking Time Bomb to Go Off in a Later Case, ELECTION
L. BLOG (Feb. 22, 2021, 6:39 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=120941 [https://perma.cc/
UM9R-QFPR].
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Though the extension was left in place and the “late” arriving ballots
were not dispositive to the state’s result in the presidential election,142
Boockvar nonetheless illustrates the potential dangers of federal court
involvement around absentee ballot deadline rules. Despite the Court’s
obvious appellate jurisdiction to decide the meaning of the term
“Legislature” in the Federal Constitution,143 the practical effects of the
various rulings in the Pennsylvania case before the election were to leave
voters in limbo around absentee ballot rules after voting had already
begun, while civilian voters whose ballots arrived shortly after Election
Day did not know if their votes would count as of December 2020.144 In
essence, even though Purcell did not apply to this case because the
litigation emanated from state court, the U.S. Supreme Court’s late role
in it right before Election Day created the very uncertainty that the Court
chides lower federal courts for causing in a different context.145 To wit,
the very involvement of the U.S. Supreme Court, irrespective of its
eventual rulings after the election, left election administrators in
Pennsylvania without clarity of election rules both before and after
Election Day.146 Under exact uniform national deadline rules, the U.S.

See supra note 140.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari . . . where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes
of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.”). See also, e.g., Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 793 (2015) (upholding the
right of Arizona citizens, by a 5-4 vote, to create an independent redistricting commission by ballot
initiative through a non-strict majority interpretation of the meaning of the word “Legislature” in
the Constitution). Justice Barrett’s replacement of Justice Ginsburg leaves the ruling in Arizona
State Legislature in doubt.
144 Jonathan Lai, 10,000 Pennsylvania Votes Are in Limbo. They Won’t Change the Outcome.
They Could Still Have a Huge Impact., PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 20, 2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-late-mail-ballots-supreme-court20201220.html [https://perma.cc/FPG3-6GBB].
145 See infra Section I.C.ii.4 (noting how the Wisconsin case is the most clear-cut application of
the Purcell principle of the three cases surveyed that began in federal court).
146 Marie Albiges & Tom Lisi, Pa. Election Officials Are Burnt Out and Leaving Their Jobs
After 2020 ‘Nightmare,’ SPOTLIGHT PA (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2020/
12/pennsylvania-election-2020-officials-retiring-nightmare [https://perma.cc/9AHL-78EQ] (“Act
77 [Pennsylvania’s no-excuse absentee ballot law] left a lot of room for interpretation and
confusion, election officials said. There were questions about what to do if a ballot wasn’t in a
secrecy envelope, or what to do with mail ballots that arrived after Election Day. Secretary of the
Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar attempted to clarify the law by issuing guidance documents to
county election officials and getting legal opinions from the courts, but the rules were constantly
changing.”). Cf. infra note 164 (noting Justice Kavanaugh’s view that court involvement before
Election Day is contradictory to U.S. Supreme Court precedent).
142
143
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Supreme Court would likely have not ruled on the absentee ballot portion
of the case.147
4. Wisconsin
In several respects, DNC is the most procedurally—and possibly
legally—simple case of the four analyzed in this Note.148 In short order,
a federal district court judge extended Wisconsin’s absentee ballot
deadline for November by employing Anderson-Burdick balancing, the
Seventh Circuit issued a stay to that decision citing Purcell in part, and
the Supreme Court denied national Democrats’ attempts to vacate the stay
by ruling that the federal district judge in the Western District of
Wisconsin had violated Purcell when he issued an absentee ballot
extension deadline.149 However, the Supreme Court issued its decision
only ten days before Election Day, giving the Justices a late opportunity
to clarify their conflicting interpretations of Anderson-Burdick balancing
and Purcell in four separate opinions.150
First, Justice Roberts wrote to clarify the discrepancy between his
vote in the Boockvar and DNC cases.151 For both Justices Gorsuch and
Kavanaugh, the prospect of vacating the stay presented an untenable
slippery slope that would potentially invalidate the other twenty-nine
state laws that required absentee ballots to arrive sometime on Election
Day.152 On the other hand, relying on the difficulties posed by the

147 See infra Part III (discussing jurisdiction stripping for federal courts). Properly tailored
legislation would severely limit both state and federal courts’ roles in any absentee ballot deadline
litigation.
148 See DNC, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.).
149 Id. at 28 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“In this case, as in several this Court has recently
addressed, a District Court intervened in the thick of election season to enjoin enforcement of a
State’s laws. Because I believe this intervention was improper, I agree with the decision of the
Seventh Circuit to stay the injunction pending appeal.”); id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Weeks
before a national election, a Federal District Judge decreed that Wisconsin law violates the
Constitution by requiring absentee voters to return their ballots no later than election day. . . . Why
did the district court seek to scuttle such a long-settled tradition in this area? COVID. Because of
the current pandemic, the court suggested, it was free to substitute its own election deadline for the
State’s.”); id. at 30 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“For three alternative and independent reasons, I
conclude that the District Court’s injunction was unwarranted. First, the District Court changed
Wisconsin’s election rules too close to the election, in contravention of this Court’s precedents.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that federal courts ordinarily should not alter state election
laws in the period close to an election—a principle often referred to as the Purcell principle.”); see
also DNC, 977 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann
(DNC), 488 F. Supp. 3d 776, 816–18 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
150 See 141 S. Ct. 28 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 28–30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at
30–40 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 40–46 (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer &
Sotomayor, JJ.).
151 See supra note 101.
152 141 S. Ct. 28 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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pandemic and a drastically different interpretation of Purcell, Justice
Kagan would have vacated the Seventh Circuit’s stay.153
The Court’s rebuke of the federal district judge in Wisconsin154 is
curious given its affirmance of the Fourth Circuit’s Wise ruling, even
though the supposed initial election rules changed right around the same
time.155 Like the Pennsylvania case, this legal hair-splitting certainly falls
within the Supreme Court’s domain, but the distinction of allowing a
consent decree to stand versus overturning a federal district court ruling
is meaningless to voters who are primarily concerned with how much
time they have to return their absentee ballots.156 In effect, the Wisconsin
decision created a functional circuit split by placing the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in the Wisconsin case in contrast with the North Carolina case.157
5. Contextualizing the Surveyed Decisions
In all, these four cases represent only a fraction of the absentee ballot
litigation of the 2020 cycle.158 Nonetheless, they helpfully demonstrate
the need to extricate the federal courts from last-minute absentee ballot
deadline rulings. Of the four cases analyzed, federal courts allowed two
ballot extensions to stand for separate reasons, while the other two saw
previously scheduled extensions reversed for equally different reasons,
too.159 In Boockvar and DNC, the different outcomes can be partially
attributed to Chief Justice Roberts providing a swing vote.160 Meanwhile,
in Simon and Boockvar, certain judges on the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, respectively, sought to decide
whether ballots arriving in between the “old” and “new” deadlines would
count after the election, leaving thousands of voters in limbo.161 In all,
this judicial quibbling at least deserves a full briefing and opinion.162

153 Id. at 42 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“At its core, Purcell tells courts to apply, not depart from,
the usual rules of equity. . . . And that means courts must consider all relevant factors, not just the
calendar.”).
154 See supra note 149.
155 DNC, 488 F. Supp. 3d 776 (W.D. Wis. 2020) (issuing opinion extending deadlines on
September 21, 2020); Wise, 978 F.3d 93, 97 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (describing parties’ joint
petitioning of the court for an agreed-upon absentee ballot extension on September 22, 2020); see
supra note 115 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 20.
158 See supra note 12.
159 See supra Sections I.C.ii.1–4.
160 See supra note 101.
161 See text accompanying notes 132 and 144; see also note 139.
162 Hasen, supra note 76, at 461–64 (arguing that the Supreme Court should publish full
opinions on election-related shadow docket cases after the fact). See also Stephen I. Vladeck, The
Supreme Court Needs to Show Its Work, ATL. (Mar. 10, 2021, 9:35 AM),
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Regardless, the conflicting web of results ultimately deserves
congressional attention.163 For the average voter in these states, the
surveyed federal courts’ legal constructions are confusing at best and
cause the very election administration issues against which Purcell
cautions.164
II. ANALYSIS: ZOOMING OUT, WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE CURRENT
SITUATION ANYWAY?
A.

Circuit Splits of Any Kind Are Antithetical to Basic Principles of
American Law

Beyond the mish-mash application of Purcell, the reality that federal
court rulings surveyed in this Note resulted in opposite outcomes for
voters is representative of a bug in American law, as circuit splits
generally have grown increasingly common in recent years.165 In their
recent Article, Jonathan M. Cohen and Daniel S. Cohen lay out five basic
legal problems that circuit splits pose: (1) they “create uncertain and
disparate applications of federal legal rights,” (2) they burden or limit
government actors under federal law based solely on location, (3) the
Supreme Court does not resolve enough of them, so many remain
indefinitely, (4) “they impair the bedrock American principle that federal
law should be uniform,” and (5) because these splits raise fundamental
fairness questions, “they may undermine the federal judiciary’s
legitimacy.”166

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/supreme-court-needs-show-its-work/618238
[https://perma.cc/P9AF-C5MU] (“For a Court whose legitimacy depends largely on the public’s
perception of its integrity, the growth of [shadow docket] decisions that disrupt life for millions of
Americans can only be a bad thing—and is reason enough for the Court to bring more of these
rulings out of the . . . shadows.”).
163 See infra Part III.
164 See DNC, 141 S. Ct. 28, 31 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (mem.) (arguing against “a
federal district court [swooping] in and alter[ing] carefully considered and democratically enacted
state election rules when an election is imminent. That important principle of judicial restraint not
only prevents voter confusion but also prevents election administrator confusion . . . .” (citing
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006))).
165 Jonathan M. Cohen & Daniel S. Cohen, Iron-ing out Circuit Splits: A Proposal for the Use
of the Irons Procedure to Prevent and Resolve Circuit Splits Among United States Courts of
Appeals, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 989 (2020).
166 Id. at 996–98 (citing, in relation to factor four, James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of
State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 824 (1992) (“Our constitutional language and
culture hold the U.S. Constitution to be the repository of the fundamental values of the national
community, a community to which every citizen belongs.”)).

30

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

At least four of these five factors are implicated in the absentee
ballot litigation described herein.167 While the authors point out several
relevant but somewhat mundane examples,168 the federal courts’
undermining of their own validity in the absentee ballot context is
particularly troublesome given the growth of election legitimacy
questions among significant portions of the public.169 Further
complicating matters, absentee ballot deadline circuit splits are some of
the few where thousands of people experience the consequences of
incidental geographical division very shortly after a court’s contrary
decision.170 In sum, absentee ballot deadline circuit splits not only
exemplify, but also amplify, the very foundational wrongs that Cohen and
Cohen describe.
B.

Congress Should Be the Ultimate Decider of Federal Election
Rules, Not Article III Courts

Like many other technical legal topics, the Constitution says nothing
about the modern mechanics of election administration whatsoever.171
Consequently, as with other hot-button issues concerning election
outcomes, there is reasonable disagreement as to what role, if any, courts
should play in shaping an election’s playing field in general.172 For
example, Professor Daniel P. Tokaji has argued specifically for Supreme
Court restraint in election administration litigation cases, since they are

167 The authors’ concerns over the Supreme Court hardly ever resolving circuit splits seems less
immediately pertinent to the absentee ballot litigation context, where the Supreme Court has been
quite active via ruling on its shadow docket. See supra Section I.C.ii.
168 Cohen & Cohen, supra note 165, at 996–97 (describing Commerce Clause and Second
Amendment circuit splits).
169 See supra note 3 highlighting voters who believed the 2020 presidential election was
fraudulent.
170 This impact for citizens stands in contrast with less publicly visible, or constitutionally and
electorally consequential, circuit splits such as the Second and Third Circuit’s narrow statutory
interpretation of “automatic telephone dialing system” under the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, versus the Ninth Circuit’s broader and inconsistent interpretation of the same. See Cohen &
Cohen, supra note 165, at 996 n.52.
171 Famously, the U.S. Constitution does not mention “slavery” once. U.S. CONST. A search for
the terms “mail,” “absentee,” and “ballot” reveal that the Constitution only uses the word “ballot”
in reference to the election of the president via the Electoral College. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
172 The justiciability debate around partisan gerrymandering is a helpful example of such a
reasonable disagreement about the role of the judiciary in shaping electoral outcomes. See generally
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (ruling that claims concerning partisan
gerrymandering are nonjusticiable political questions for federal courts). But see League of Women
Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 289 (2018) (per curiam) (describing the exercise
of jurisdiction over gerrymandering claims and striking down the state legislature’s congressional
district maps as “clearly, plainly and palpably violat[ing] the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania”).
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fact intensive in nature, have “weighty democratic values at stake,” their
procedural postures often “necessitate[] expedited consideration,” and
there is a “heated political atmosphere” surrounding them.173 While
Professor Tokaji has hit the nail on the head in terms of identifying the
problem with Supreme Court intervention in election administration
cases, his solution of letting lower federal courts play a greater role in
resolving election litigation on the eve of elections is inadequate.174
Instead, one must look to history for the Founders’ original intent
regarding election administration to ascertain the proper role for federal
courts in election litigation.
At the constitutional convention, debate raged over how best to
conduct elections for both houses of Congress, as well as the executive
branch in what would become the Presidency.175 In concerning itself with
the overall conduct of congressional elections, the resulting Elections
Clause is situated at the intersection of federalism and separation of
powers:176 “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”177
The plain meaning of the words “make or alter” grants Congress the
authority both to preempt and supersede state law regulating federal
elections, and to create original federal laws concerning these elections,
too.178 In Samuel Johnson’s 1768 Dictionary of the English Language,
among the top definitions of “make” is “to create,” “to form,” or “to
173 Tokaji, supra note 77, at 1067 (identifying the four factors in the context of criticizing
Purcell).
174 For example, Tokaji uses a district court judge’s handling of a challenge to Ohio’s Voter ID
law days before the 2006 midterm elections to note that federal district court judges are well
positioned to clarify voting rules on the eve of the election given their ability to work closely with
the parties’ attorneys—in contrast to an appellate court—and their ability to “encourage settlement
that will clarify the rules of the game.” See id. at 1085–86. However, this praise ignores that the
distinction of whether a court of appellate jurisdiction or a district court rules on an election
provision on the eve of the election is meaningless to those most affected by such decisions. See,
e.g., Lucien Bruggeman, ‘Like a Yo-Yo’: Election Officials Grapple with Flood of Confusing LastMinute Rule Changes, ABC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2020, 7:56 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/yoyo-election-officials-grapple-flood-confusing-minute/story?id=73890047
[https://perma.cc/
KW58-68K5] (quoting an election administrator in Michigan’s reaction to court rulings from
different levels as a “blizzard of legal challenges, conflicting rulings, deadline extensions and lastminute rule changes, [which] ha[ve] only compounded []confusion, . . . ‘We get a directive, then a
judge says “no.” We get another directive, and the appeals court says “no.” It has not been easy.’”).
175 JESSE WEGMAN, LET THE PEOPLE PICK THE PRESIDENT: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE 67–71 (2020).
176 Michael T. Morley, The New Elections Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 79, 104
(2016).
177 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. See supra note 16.
178 Brief Amici Curiae of Constitutional Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 2–8,
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013) (No. 12-71), 2013 WL 267029.
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produce.”179 “[A]lter” is defined as “to change,” and “to make otherwise
than it is.”180 In other words, the Clause’s power is not limited to a check
on state power; it provides Congress with the opportunity to proactively
legislate. That this Clause gives Congress an enormous amount of power
was never in doubt at the time of the nation’s founding; in fact, precisely
because of this vast textual grant of power, the Elections Clause became
one of many sticking points between Federalists and Anti-Federalists
during the Ratification debates.181
Aware of Anti-Federalist opposition, Alexander Hamilton defended
the Elections Clause in three of his fifty-one essays in the Federalist
Papers.182 In The Federalist No. 59, Hamilton explained that at the
constitutional convention, delegates aimed to create a federal elections
system which provided for a degree of flexibility, arguing that there
would be “extraordinary circumstances” where the “interposition” of the
eventual Congress would become necessary.183 In so doing, Hamilton
poked at a fundamental contention between Federalists and AntiFederalists surrounding the Elections Clause: the former group was
fearful of state legislatures exercising too much power over the new
national government—one of the very causes of the constitutional
convention in the first instance—while Anti-Federalists feared an allpowerful national government, including Congress.184 Thus, the terms
“extraordinary circumstances” and “necessary” reflect Hamilton’s desire
for Congress to have the final say over disputed issues related to elections
while trying to temper opponents’ criticism of the Clause.185 Noticeably
Make, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1768).
See Alter, JOHNSON, supra note 179; see also Alter, THOMAS SHERIDAN, A GENERAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780).
181 Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 178. See also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484,
2495 (2019) (“During the subsequent fight for ratification, the provision remained a subject of
debate.”).
182 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 59, 60, 61, at 397–414 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
183 THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In
relevant part, Hamilton argued, “[Delegates] have submitted the regulation of elections for the
Federal Government in the first instance to the local administrations; which in ordinary cases, and
when no improper views prevail, may be both more convenient and more satisfactory; but they
have reserved to the national authority a right to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances
might render that interposition necessary to its safety. Nothing can be more evident, than that an
exclusive power of regulating elections for the National Government, in the hands of the State
Legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy.” Id. (emphasis added).
184 See WEGMAN, supra note 175, at 59–61 (describing the main contentions between the
Federalists and Anti-Federalists up until and at the beginning of the Constitutional Convention of
1787).
185 See Anthony Peacock, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Election Regulations,
HERITAGE
FOUND.,
https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/19/electionregulations [https://perma.cc/4P99-5TQB] (conceding Hamilton’s desire to have Congress reign
179
180
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absent, however, is any discussion of either state or federal courts
resolving such disputes.186
Though the Federalist Papers argued in favor of judicial review
generally, the federal judiciary’s vast powers far outpace what the
Papers’ authors had in mind.187 While the general efficacy of such
expansive power falls beyond the scope of this Note, federal courts’
ability to change election rules—either by recognizing or reversing equal
protection claims, invalidating or approving mutual consent decrees, or
claiming to apply Purcell correctly—days before the conclusion of
federal elections interlopes on the intent of the Founders to ensure that
Congress has the ultimate say regarding federal election
administration.188
i.

Congress’s Elections Clause Power Is Currently Underutilized

Recent scholarship has noted that the Elections Clause provides for
broad federal powers even if Congress infrequently exercises its power
under the Clause.189 Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has long
provided Congress with a roadmap for the legislative branch’s vast
Elections Clause powers, including vote counting and supervision.190
supreme on federal election rules, but arguing that Congress’s post-ratification interventions in the
arena have not met Hamilton’s own “extraordinary circumstances” bar).
186 See supra note 182. A search for the terms “judge,” “justice,” “tribunal,” “court,” and
“adjudicate” in The Federalist Nos. 59, 60, and 61 reveal that “court” is found once in the context
of its use as the verb “to court,” in The Federalist No. 60. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 59, 60, 61 at
397–414 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“But what is to be the object of this
capricious partiality in the national councils? . . . [W]ill it court the elevation of ‘the wealthy and
the well-born’ to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?” (emphasis supplied)).
However, the use of the word has nothing to do with a “court” in the legal context of the word. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 405–06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In other
words, the present practice of federal courts molding state election rules on the eve of federal
elections was likely not contemplated by the Founders, or at least not by Publius.
187 CARSON HOLLOWAY, AGAINST JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE FOUNDERS AND THE LIMITS ON
THE COURTS 16 (2019), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/against-judicial-supremacy-thefounders-and-the-limits-the-courts [https://perma.cc/66W5-ZD2Z] (arguing that the Federalist
Papers envisioned judicial review as a power limited to striking down “clear cases of
unconstitutional action on the part of the people’s representatives”).
188 See supra Section I.C.ii’s discussion of the respective timelines in each case surveyed.
189 Zachary Newkirk, An Untapped “Arsenal of Power”: The Elections Clause, a Federal
Election Administration Agency, and Federal Election Oversight, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 143
(2019) (arguing in favor of using Congress’s Elections Clause power to create independent federal
oversight of American elections).
190 See, e.g., Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). The Smiley Court noted that in addition to
the time and place of elections for members of Congress, the body, through the Elections Clause,
has control over “notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of
fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and
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Historically, exercising this power has included the standardization of
certain election laws that today seem so basic that one may find it
shocking to discover that they were once not existent at the federal
level.191 Specifically, prior to the 1840s, the presidential election did not
end on the same day, i.e., there was no uniform Election Day, and prior
to 1876, members of the House of Representatives were not elected on
the same day as the president.192 In these instances, although questionable
state election administration—among other factors—triggered the push
towards federal standardization, today Congress’s ability to legislate is
nonetheless unreduced when the culprit of needlessly tinkering with
election rules is the federal courts.193 Additionally, even though such
earlier intervention was met with opposition, these specific actions
provide a roadmap for future legislation because of their emphasis on
bold federal uniformity.194
More recently, however, Congress’s most prominent exercises of its
Elections Clause power have arguably been the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA).195 These laws pass on to the several states webs of base
requirements for voter registration and election administration,
respectively, rather than a complete and total federal overhaul and
administration for either process.196 As a result, NVRA and HAVA are
cautionary tales of an underutilized Elections Clause, given that plenty of
litigation persists concerning both laws, as in the absentee ballot deadline

publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and
safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right
involved.” Id. at 366.
191 BEN LEUBSDORF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46413, ELECTION DAY: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 2 (2021).
192 Id.
193 Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Jessica E. Boscarino & Rogan T. Kersh, Congressional Intrusion to
Specify State Voting Dates for National Offices, 38 PUBLIUS J. FEDERALISM 137, 141 (2008)
(noting that states voting on different days led to more opportunities for voter fraud).
194 Id. at 149 (recounting how the push for a uniform Election Day for the House was met with
sizeable opposition).
195 See National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 (requiring states to provide
at least three different accessible mechanisms to register to vote); About the National Voter
Registration Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-national-voterregistration-act [https://perma.cc/Y2R9-AHES] (noting that three states required additional time to
be NVRA compliant due to the need to change their respective state constitutions after NVRA’s
passage); Help America Vote Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (creating a clearinghouse for federal
election administration information and passing minimum standards for voting, including the
requirement of allowing provisional voting).
196 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a) (laying out requirements for states regarding voter
registration provisions, including a standard voter registration form for when voters register to vote
at any state’s Department of Motor Vehicles or equivalent); see also 52 U.S.C. §§ 20921–20930
(establishing the Election Assistance Commission to, inter alia, aid states in meeting HAVA’s
voting equipment requirements, while simultaneously limiting the agency’s rulemaking ability).
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domain.197 Thus, to extricate federal courts from absentee ballot deadline
decision making, Congress should go big or go home. To be sure,
unprecedented federal action should not be confused with
unconstitutional federal action.198
III. PROPOSAL
A.

A Framework for Standardization More Effective Than H.R. 1

Initially, priorities for a federal law standardizing absentee ballot
deadlines may be difficult to define as there are several aspects of the
process that Congress could emphasize. That said, Congress has not been
totally asleep at the wheel in attempting to federally standardize many
absentee ballot procedures.199 As recently as March 2021, the U.S. House
passed a sweeping election reform bill, H.R. 1, that, among other
provisions, eliminates many of the onerous requirements on who could
vote absentee.200 The legislation is a useful point of comparison because
the House has passed the bill in two consecutive Congresses.201 However,
the law’s absentee ballot timeline provisions are a mishmash.202 For
example, the law creates a single postmark deadline on Election Day,

197 For an in depth look at the status of voting registration litigation involving NVRA, see Dale
E. Ho, Election Day Registration and the Limits of Litigation, 129 YALE L.J. F. 185 (2019); see
also, e.g., Iowa Voter All. v. Black Hawk Cnty., 515 F. Supp. 3d 980 (N.D. Iowa 2021) (alleging
election administrators violated both HAVA and NVRA).
198 Franita Tolson, The Elections Clause and the Underenforcement of Federal Law, 129 YALE
L.J. F. 171, 184 (2019) (“While Congress has used [its Elections Clause] authority sparingly,
leading to confusion about its actual scope, there are historical precedents that go beyond [recent
proposed legislation] in their assertion of federal power. In any case, unprecedented or novel
exercises of federal power should not be confused with unlawful uses of federal authority.”).
199 See, e.g., Vote by Mail Act of 2019, S. 26, 116th Cong. (2019); see also supra note 17.
200 See For the People Act, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 307(a)(2)(A) (2021) (prohibiting voter ID
requirements for absentee ballots); § 307(a)(2)(B) (preempting state laws which require
notarization and a witness signature on absentee ballots).
201 See supra note 17. The author acknowledges that Congressional Democrats in the 117th
Congress have attempted to pass other voting rights legislation that concerns, or relates to, some of
the ideas expressed herein. See, e.g., Jacob Pramuk, Senate Republicans Block Democrats’
Sweeping Voting, Ethics Bill, CNBC (June 22, 2021 7:45 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/22/
senate-to-vote-on-s1-for-the-people-act-bill.html [https://perma.cc/6A9U-FDRM] (describing how
the U.S. Senate’s version of H.R. 1, the For the People Act—also known as S. 1—failed to pass the
chamber); Nicholas Reimann, John Lewis Voting Rights Act Fails to Pass Senate, FORBES (Nov.
3, 2021, 3:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2021/11/03/john-lewis-votingrights-act-fails-to-pass-senate/?sh=2427e2ebb3d2 [https://perma.cc/S43C-MBES] (detailing how
Democrats’ proposed revamp of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 failed to pass the Senate). However,
in light of the failure of any of this legislation to become law, H.R. 1 still remains a helpful
framework for the reasons stated herein.
202 See infra note 203 and accompanying text.

36

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

while states may impose their own “reasonable” request deadlines
beforehand and may not make their ballot receipt deadlines less than ten
days post-Election Day.203 Thus, while it is unclear whether H.R. 1 will
become law in the foreseeable future without a strong majority of
Democratic senators,204 its passage as written would not distort this
Note’s central thesis because litigants could still attack disparate absentee
ballot deadlines on equal protection grounds.205
Instead, a better piece of legislation would include a special focus
on singular and specific request, postmark, and receiving deadlines,
where congressional compromises remain possible. For instance,
considering that most states already require absentee ballots to arrive at
some point on Election Day, such a provision choosing an hour on
Election Day should be a blueprint of bipartisan compromise.206
Furthermore, legislation zeroing in on a national deadline compromise
could theoretically do away with state laws concerning postmark
deadlines, at least one of which currently exists because there is no
corresponding absentee ballot receipt deadline.207

For the People Act, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. §§ 307(a)(2)(C), (e)(1), (e)(2) (2021).
Though the 117th Congress is composed of thin Democratic House and Senate majorities,
voting rights bills must receive sixty votes to end legislative debate. See Peter W. Stevenson, Here’s
What H.R. 1, the House-Passed Voting Rights Bill, Would Do, WASH. POST (June 2, 2021, 12:44
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/05/hr1-bill-what-is-it [https://perma.cc/
XD3P-7CEK] (“But if they actually want [H.R. 1] to pass, Democrats don’t have a lot of
options. . . . H.R. 1 isn’t being passed through the special reconciliation process that requires a
simple majority. Democrats’ other option is to eliminate part or all of the legislative
filibuster . . . .”). Filibuster reform requires a simple majority but is no easy political task. See
generally Giovanni Russonello, Will Democrats Nix (or Weaken) the Filibuster?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
15,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/us/politics/democrats-filibuster-manchinsinema.html [https://perma.cc/YF4P-NFKH] (noting that many of the Democrats’ legislative
priorities are dead in the Senate if the filibuster remains unchanged). See also infra text
accompanying Section III.C (noting Republican opposition to the bill).
205 H.R. 1’s ten-day minimum ballot acceptance deadline would likely reduce some of the
litigation that this Note focuses on the most, but litigants could still bring equal protection claims
to persuade courts to extend deadlines to align with states with longer deadlines than the ten-day
baseline. Further, the “reasonable” request deadline provision would become the subject of equally
contentious litigation as state legislatures unhappy with the ten-day receipt deadline could seek to
shrink the ballot request window as much as possible. See supra note 44. Thus, H.R. 1 could shift
the focus of absentee ballot deadline litigation from the back-end to the front-end of the vote-bymail process.
206 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting that Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch
took umbrage with a district court judge in Wisconsin altering ballot deadlines in part because
Wisconsin is one of the thirty states requiring ballots to arrive on election day).
207 Laurel Demkovich, Wondering if Your Ballot’s Been Counted? Here’s How to Track It in
Washington and Idaho, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Oct. 25, 2020), https://www.spokesman.com/
stories/2020/oct/25/wondering-if-your-ballots-been-counted-heres-how-t [https://perma.cc/JA4QPHPT] (noting that Washington’s mail-in ballots must be postmarked by 8:00 PM on Nov. 3, 2020
(Election Day) and there is no arrival deadline in that state, whereas ballots in Idaho must be
received by county Elections Offices at the exact same time).
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While some of these suggestions could be read as invitations to
restrict the franchise by restricting ballot deadlines in the minority of
states that currently have them after Election Day, the net positives would
outweigh the net negatives by streamlining the absentee ballot process to
enable more votes to count regardless of whatever uniform deadline is
chosen.208 Put simply, the specific details of such legislation are less
important than a couple overarching goals: 1) eliminating as many
deadline timeframe discrepancies for requesting and returning ballots as
possible, which H.R. 1 fails to do; and 2) reducing the amount and
complexity of deadline rules. One can easily envision a world in which
voters nationally are all able to begin requesting ballots on one date, and
every voter knows that their ballots must arrive by a uniform deadline on
Election Day.209
B.

Exploring a Jurisdictional-Stripping Element

Any future absentee ballot standardization law must be able to
withstand legal attack. To do so, language in it must include a finding of
Congress that the Act is meant to reduce the litigation discussed herein.210
Furthermore, Congress could go so far as to add a jurisdiction-stripping
element to the law, in order to prevent the intervention of federal courts
prior to federal elections.211 For example, this could include a provision
that prevents any federal appellate adjudication regarding the proposed
statute a certain amount of time before an election.212 While this may

208 See generally Mike Ellis, Absentee Voting at Record Levels Already, as Confusion Over Mail
Ballots
Continues,
GREENVILLE
NEWS
(Sept.
30,
2020,
6:04
AM),
https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/2020/09/30/record-absentee-voting-alreadyconfusion-over-mail-ballots-witness-signatures/3571556001
[https://perma.cc/YV47-TLGS]
(noting that absentee ballots face higher rejection rates than their Election Day-vote counterparts);
Anna Baringer, Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Voting by Mail and Ballot Rejection:
Lessons from Florida for Elections in the Age of the Coronavirus, 19 ELECTION L.J. 289, 314–15
(2020) (stating that equity concerns over vote-by-mail due to disparate state laws and procedures
are nothing new).
209 Theoretically, if Congress set a national date earlier than October for initial ballot requests,
this would put pressure on courts to resolve any lingering litigation around absentee voting earlier
than much of the contentious, late-breaking cases analyzed herein. See Section I.C.ii.5’s discussion
of Wise, Boockvar, Simon, and DNC. H.R. 1’s reasonable deadline requirement fails to achieve this
goal.
210 In the past, Congress has passed legislation solely to reduce litigation or the abuse of the
courts for particularized ends. See, e.g., Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act, H.R. 758, 114th Cong.
(2015).
211 For an in-depth discussion of the legal murkiness surrounding jurisdiction stripping, see
KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10100, JURISDICTION STRIPPING: WHEN MAY
CONGRESS PROHIBIT THE COURTS FROM HEARING A CASE? 1–4 (2018).
212 This is not to suggest that federal courts could not “say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Rather, they would simply need to wait until after an election to do so.
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sound radical at first, jurisdiction stripping is nothing new. 213 Relatedly,
Congress has enacted several laws with jurisdictional-stripping elements
over the last thirty years.214 While this framework would potentially push
any lingering absentee ballot deadline litigation into state court,215 such
litigation would be greatly reduced under the proposed law—if nothing
else—because litigants would have less statutory language to target under
a uniform standard.216 Over time, the thought of a court entertaining a
case moving the national absentee ballot deadline—irrespective of valid
constitutional claims—could become just as unthinkable as a court
delaying the date for congressional elections and the appointment of
presidential electors, both of which are affixed by statute, rather than the
Constitution.217
C.

In Defense of Federal Standardization

Though this Note critiques particular provisions of H.R. 1,218 the bill
has sparked fierce Republican opposition to its entirety.219 Incidentally,
this antagonism has brought forth many of the legal arguments that would
apply to states’ potential opposition to this Note’s specific proposal.220
213 See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (unanimously holding that Congress may strip
the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction at any time); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381,
385–86 (1881) (“[W]hile the appellate power of this court under the Constitution extends to all
cases within the judicial power of the United States, actual jurisdiction under the power is confined
within such limits as Congress sees fit to prescribe. . . . What those powers shall be, and to what
extent they shall be exercised, are, and always have been, proper subjects of legislative control.”);
see also Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Congress need not give this Court any appellate power; it may
withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred . . . .”).
214 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (limiting the
number of habeas corpus petitions available to prison inmates and federal appellate courts’ ability
to review them).
215 Congress cannot strip state courts of their jurisdiction to hear cases based on state
constitutional grounds. See Michael C. Dorf, Congressional Power to Strip State Courts of
Jurisdiction, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2018).
216 See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 46.
217 See 2 U.S.C. § 7 (“The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even
numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States . . . of
Representatives . . . to the Congress . . . .”); 3 U.S.C. § 1 (“The electors of President and Vice
President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November,
in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and Vice President.”).
218 See supra text accompanying notes 202–205.
219 See, e.g., Kevin McCarthy, The Truth Behind Democrats’ Election Bill, H.R. 1, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mg-voAFowfI [https://perma.cc/MN2WC3WL].
220 See David B. Rivkin Jr. & Jason Snead, An Unconstitutional Voting ‘Reform,’ WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 16, 2021, 12:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-unconstitutional-voting-reform-

2022]

STANDARDIZING STATE VOTE-BY-MAIL DEADLINES

39

This includes a letter from twenty of twenty-six Republican state
attorneys general to congressional leaders outlining legal arguments
against any further federalization of elections.221 With respect to
standardization in the absentee ballot context for federal elections, the
attorneys general put forth two principal arguments: (1) that Congress has
no power to choose the “Manner” of appointing presidential electors and,
for congressional elections, (2) under the Supreme Court’s
proportionality doctrine, Congress may not bestow more voting rights
onto individuals than those that are already constitutionally protected.222
These arguments do not carry weight upon further examination. For
presidential elections, there is no reason that states should not retain
control over how to appoint their presidential electors.223 In fact, state
legislatures and local election administrators are the ones who have
chosen to appoint electors in accordance with popular vote winners and
place presidential candidates with congressional candidates on the same
ballot, respectively.224 So long as ballots are designed with congressional
candidates on them, then Congress’s Elections Clause authority to
regulate those ballots is undisturbed.225 Additionally, the proportionality
doctrine is inapposite. The absentee ballot standardization opponents rely
principally on City of Boerne v. Flores, in which the Supreme Court
struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) as
unconstitutional because it substantively altered constitutional
protections and thus impinged on states’ usual police powers. 226 Such
reliance is deeply misplaced. The recommended election law changes in
this Note are instead related to timing under the Elections Clause, while
RFRA was a statute at the intersection of the Fourteenth and First
11613497134 [https://perma.cc/C32L-U86N] (noting the differences between the Electors Clause
and the Elections Clause). Interestingly, the op-ed’s authors state that the law’s provisions as they
apply to congressional elections are “bad policy,” thus meaning they inherently concede H.R. 1’s
constitutionality as applied to congressional elections. See id.
221 Letter from Todd Rokita, Ind. Att’y Gen., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives, et al. (Mar. 3, 2021), https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/INAG/2021/
03/03/file_attachments/1712412/HR1%20Letter%20332021.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL24-5B3M].
222 Id.
223 Any suggestion to the contrary would require a constitutional amendment to enact. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
224 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–14 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); The Art
of the Vote: Who Designs the Ballots We Cast?, NPR (Nov. 6, 2016, 6:51 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/06/500678100/the-art-of-the-vote-who-designs-the-ballots-we-cast
[https://perma.cc/A8YY-WTXW] (“There is no federal ballot design authority . . . .”).
225 States could theoretically put congressional candidates on different ballots, but this would
likely increase election costs. See Election Costs: What States Pay, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electioncosts.aspx [https://perma.cc/45ZV-JHF9] (noting that paying hourly personnel, necessary for
counting ballots on Election night, is usually the most costly budgetary item for local election
officials).
226 See supra note 221; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997).
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Amendments.227 Here, however, standardizing absentee ballot deadlines
merely falls within the Elections Clause’s plain text, and the attorneys
general noticeably ignore any textual analysis of the latter half of the
Elections Clause in their faulty argument.228 Unlike RFRA, this Note’s
proposal only falls within a constitutional provision, rather than
unlawfully altering one.
CONCLUSION
President Joe Biden won the 2020 election, but the run-up to it
revealed that our nation’s election system is badly in need of repair.229
While COVID-19 led to an expansion of mail-in voting, the pandemic
also exposed many state laws to legal challenges on equal protection
grounds, as well as intervening counterattacks.230 Specifically, absentee
ballot deadline cases in Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin relied on legal standards that are prone to contradicting
applications, while such rulings occurred too close to Election Day to
avoid sowing public confusion and creating new functional circuit
splits.231
Even though as a country we do not know when the next global
catastrophe will again disturb our election system, now is the time for
Congress to act under its Elections Clause power to standardize absentee
ballot request, postmark, and arrival deadlines for federal elections. In so
doing, such a law must include H.R. 1’s generous mail voting eligibility
provisions while also stating individual calendar dates232 for request,
postmark, and deadline rules, and potentially include some type of
jurisdiction-stripping or delay element for federal courts. Such an act
would be unprecedented in its scope, yet wholly constitutional, tapping
into an underutilized “arsenal of [federal] power.”233 Certainly, it is
incumbent on Congress to take such action before too many Americans
lose faith in one of our most important institutions: partially decentralized
elections that are free and fair.
See Flores, 521 U.S. at 519–20.
See supra note 221; see also supra Section II.B’s textual analysis of the Elections Clause.
229 Jonathan Lemire, Zeke Miller & Will Weissert, Biden Defeats Trump for White House, Says
‘Time to Heal,’ ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-winswhite-house-ap-fd58df73aa677acb74fce2a69adb71f9 [https://perma.cc/DKL3-JERF].
230 See supra notes 46 and 93.
231 See supra Section I.C.ii.
232 Unambiguous language akin to 2 U.S.C. § 7 and 3 U.S.C. § 1 would be ideal. See supra note
217.
233 Newkirk, supra note 189, at 171 (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 330 (1941)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Elections Clause is “an arsenal of power ample to protect
Congressional elections from any and all forms of pollution.”)).
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